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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Under Article 38 of the Constitution1 no one can be tried on a 
criminal offence without a jury, save in certain circumstances, one of 
which is where the case involves a “minor offence”.2  A minor 
offence is currently interpreted to mean an offence for which the 
punishment does not exceed 12 months imprisonment and/or €3,000.  
These maxima therefore act as a cut-off point in determining what 
offences attract the right to jury trial in this jurisdiction.3  The aim of 
this Report is to consider the appropriateness of such upper limits, 
particularly in the light of the central role accorded to jury trial in our 
criminal justice system.  In England, the birth-place of trial by jury, 
the most frequently quoted encomium for the jury is Lord Devlin’s 
description of it as “the lamp that shows that freedom lives”.4  In this 
jurisdiction too, trial by jury occupies a position at the apex of our 
legal system by virtue of Article 38.  
 
2. It is important, however, to emphasise the limited ambit of this 
Report.  It does not purport to examine the whole range of District 
Court sentencing options, but rather focuses primarily on the terms of 
imprisonment and the fines which may be imposed by that Court for 
minor offences.  Further, the Commission is not suggesting any limit 
on a District Court judge’s5 sentencing jurisdiction where an accused 
                                                 
1 Article 38.2 states: “Minor offences may be tried by courts of summary 
jurisdiction.”  Article 38.5 states: “Save in the case of the trial of offences 
under s.2, s.3, or s.4 of this Article no person shall be tried on any criminal 
charge without a jury.”   
2  There are two other exceptions to the constitutional imperative of trial by 
jury.  These are Article 38.3 and 38.4 which create exceptions for special 
courts and military courts respectively.   
3  See paragraphs 1.19 and 1.23 below. 
4  Devlin Trial by Jury (London Stevens 1966) at 164. 
5  Section 2(1)(b) of the Courts Act 1991 substituted the title “judge of the 
District Court” for the old title “justice of the District Court”.  Judges of the 
District Court are therefore referred to herein as “District Court judges”.   
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consents to summary trial or where there is a guilty plea.6  As a result, 
the Commission’s recommendation on sentencing pertains only to 
summary offences and offences which are triable summarily at the 
direction of the Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”) (so-called 
“hybrid” offences). 
 
3. The law governing penalties for minor offences is one of the 
areas to be examined as part of the Commission’s Second Programme 
for Law Reform.  In accordance with usual procedure, the 
Commission produced as an initial step a Consultation Paper on 
Penalties for Minor Offences7 which was published in March 2002.  
This initial examination of the topic led the Commission to make four 
provisional recommendations relating to prison sentences and fines 
which may be imposed for a minor offence.  These were as follows: 
 
(1) There should be a clear statutory headline to the effect that 
the District Court may impose a prison sentence of up to a 
maximum of six months only for minor offences. 
(2) There should be an obligation on a District Court judge to 
give written reasons for a decision to impose a custodial 
sentence. 
(3) The law should be adjusted to state explicitly that higher 
fines may be imposed where an offender is well-off. 
(4) In the case of a corporation, the maximum fine possible 
should be increased to a level three times higher than that 
for natural persons.   
 
4. Since then the Commission has sought and received written 
and oral submissions on the topic which have proved extremely 
helpful in its deliberations.  In addition, in July the Commission held 
what proved to be an exceptionally lively seminar which was attended 
by many distinguished lawyers and several judges from all four main 
courts.  The names of those who attended the seminar are listed in 
Appendix 1.  To those who attended the seminar or who made written 
or oral submissions on the subject, the Commission is most grateful.  
 
5. This Report considers each of these four recommendations in 
the light of this wisdom and experience.  The Report is divided in two 
                                                 
6        See s.2(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1951 as amended and s.13 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 1967. 
7  CP18-2002. 
 3
parts.  Part I comprises Chapters 1 to 3 which examine the 
recommendations relating to the imposition of terms of imprisonment 
in respect of minor offences.  Part II consists of Chapters 4 to 6 and 
concerns the level of fine imposed for a minor offence.  Chapter 1 
briefly summarises the law as it currently stands in relation to minor 
offences dealing first with the statutory framework and then the case 
law interpreting the central constitutional provision, Article 38.2.  
Chapter 2 revisits the proposal to limit the maximum term of 
imprisonment to six months for a minor offence.  In Chapter 3 the 
Commission develops its argument in relation to its second 
provisional recommendation.  Chapter 4 discusses the 
recommendation that fines may or should be adjusted according to the 
financial circumstances of an offender in line with the principle of 
equality of impact.  Chapter 5 elaborates on one of the main 
difficulties with the recommendation in Chapter 4 namely, how an 
offender’s means may be ascertained expeditiously by the District 
Court.  Chapter 6 deals with the proposal to increase the maximum 
fine for companies and includes some comparative analysis with other 
jurisdictions.  A final chapter provides a summary of the 
Commission’s recommendations.  
 
6. As noted above, this paper is concerned with only two types of 
penalty which may be imposed in respect of a minor offence namely, 
terms of imprisonment and fines.  However, by way of indicating 
future plans it is apposite to mention at this juncture that the 
Commission is interested in developing alternatives to custody for 
minor offences.  Indeed those District Court judges who attended the 
seminar were fully in favour of providing the District Court with real 
alternatives to imprisonment.  Among those mooted were weekend or 
night-time orders, supervision orders, suspension orders, confiscation 
orders, and safety orders.  In this regard, it is salutary to note recent 
developments in Britain.  The authors of the most recent English 
White Paper, published last year and entitled Justice for All,8 have 
sought to provide sentencers with a better framework within which to 
tailor sentences to the offender and the offence.  In pursuit of this aim 
the new sentences proposed in the White Paper include customised 
community sentences, “custody plus” (a short prison sentence 
followed by a community programme), “custody minus” (a short 
suspended prison sentence followed by community service) and 
“intermittent custody” (where a prison sentence and community 
                                                 
8  CJS: Justice for All (London HMSO 2002) (Cmnd 5563) at paragraph 4.19. 
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sentence are served intermittently).  The development of non-
custodial alternatives is an important topic and one which has a direct 
bearing on the subject matter of this Report.  A greater range of 
alternatives to custodial sentences should be developed in order to 
offer alternatives to the use of prison as a default sanction because so 
few non-custodial options are available.9 
 
7. Likewise, the law in relation to fines should be viewed against 
a wider background.  This Report surveys the process of determining 
the amount of the fine to be imposed by the court.  However, there are 
considerable difficulties in the area of fines at a later stage in the 
process namely, collection.  In this regard it is of note that, in the 
period between the publication of the Consultation Paper on 
Penalties for Minor Offences10 and this Report, the Report of the High 
Level Group on the Collection of Fines11 and the Nexus Research Co-
operative Final Report on Imprisonment for Fine Default and Civil 
Debt12 have been published.  These reports have highlighted the 
current problems in relation to the enforcement of court-imposed 
fines and the need for reform in this area.  Such reforms may well be 
included in the proposed Enforcement of Fines Bill.  The Commission 
has made its own contribution in this area with the publication in July 
2002 of an updated Report on the Indexation of Fines.13  While the 
                                                 
9  In this regard see the comments of the Sub-Committee on Crime and 
Punishment of the Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and 
Women’s Rights in its Report on Alternatives to Fines and the Uses of 
Prison (2000) at paragraph 36: “It is possible that prison is widely used 
because there is an insufficient range of alternative penalties which are 
attractive to the courts and perceived as tough and effective by the public.  
Under these circumstances it is difficult to establish the right emphasis to 
place on prison.   The true demand for prison will only emerge when a 
proper range of alternatives is in place.”  The Final Report of the Expert 
Group on the Probation and Welfare Service (1999) also found at paragraph 
1.10 that, “[the] courts, in many instances, have not been in a position to 
impose non-custodial sanctions in suitable cases, due to the absence of the 
necessary range of options.”  Accordingly, it strongly recommended a shift 
in policy to facilitate the increased use of a much greater range of non-
custodial sanctions.  
10  CP18-2002. 
11  Dublin Stationery Office 2001. 
12  Nexus Research Co-operative Final Report to Department of Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform on Imprisonment for Fine Default and Civil Debt 
(Dublin Stationery Office 2002). 
13  Law Reform Commission Report on the Indexation of Fines: A Review of 
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present Report has slightly different objectives from that Report, it 
would nevertheless be appropriate and convenient if the 
recommendations made here in relation to fines were implemented in 
tandem with any legislation on the indexation of fines.  To the extent 
that the analysis made here intersects with that on indexation 
published in the recent Report, it is referred to at the appropriate 
points. 
 
8. It should be noted that since most of the statutes cited in this 
paper refer to punts, both the punt value and its euro equivalent are 
stated.  
                                                                                                                  
Developments (LRC 65-2002). 
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PART I: MINOR OFFENCES AND PRISON SENTENCES 
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CHAPTER 1:  DISTRICT COURT JURISDICTION AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.01 This chapter consists of a brief summary of the jurisdiction of 
the District Court.  A more comprehensive treatment of this topic can 
be found in the Chapters 1 to 3 of the Consultation Paper.  It is 
important to reiterate that the first recommendation which examines 
the sentencing powers of the District Court and which forms the 
subject matter of Chapter 2, relates only to summary offences and 
“hybrid” offences, discussed at (a) and (d) below respectively.  
However in order to present a complete picture it is proposed to set 
out herein all of the different types of offences in relation to which the 
District Court can exercise its summary jurisdiction.  
 
 
A. Summary Jurisdiction and Indictable Offences Triable 
Summarily 
 
1.02 At common law, trial by jury was the only form of 
proceedings known to the law in criminal matters for many 
centuries.14  The middle decades of the nineteenth century, however, 
saw the enactment of a number of statutes extending the use of 
summary trial in respect of certain offences.15  Thus prior to the 
enactment of the 1922 Constitution, the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 
1851, the Summary Jurisdiction (Ireland) (Amendment) Act 1871 and 
the Fines (Ireland) Acts 1851-74 (known collectively as the Summary 
Jurisdiction Acts) regulated and prescribed the procedure for the 
                                                 
14  Trial by jury had gradually become the main form of trial at common law 
since the prohibition of trial by ordeal by Pope Innocent III in November 
1215.   
15  These statutes created both offences which could only be tried summarily 
and offences which were triable either way.  An example of the former is 19 
George 2 c.21 (which was an Act to prevent profane cursing and swearing).  
In respect of the latter category a number of either way offences were created 
by the Dublin Police Act 1842 and the Criminal Justice Act 1855.  
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exercise of summary jurisdiction by Justices of the Peace sitting at 
Petty Sessions.  Indeed it should be noted that some of these Acts 
remain in force and continue to govern certain procedural aspects of 
the District Court’s jurisdiction.16  
 
1.03 On the establishment of the Irish Free State (Saorstat Éireann), 
the District Court became the court of summary jurisdiction in 
relation to criminal matters, dealing with approximately 90% of all 
criminal cases.  The District Court can exercise its summary 
jurisdiction in the following three situations: in relation to summary 
offences; indictable offences which may be triable summarily; and 
guilty pleas.  This Chapter will now elaborate on each of these heads 
of jurisdiction.  
 
 
(a) Summary Offences 
 
1.04 Section 77 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924 states: 
 
“The District Court shall have and exercise all powers, 
jurisdictions, and authorities which immediately before the 6th 
day of December 1922 were vested by statute or otherwise in 
Justices or a Justice of the Peace sitting at Petty Sessions.” 
 
1.05 This provision refers back to the pre-independence legislation 
referred to above, of which the most significant Acts are the Petty 
Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851 and the Fines (Ireland) Act 1851-74.  
Post-independence statutes have gone on to add to the miscellaneous 
collection of summary offences over which the Court has jurisdiction. 
 
 
(b) Indictable Offences Triable Summarily 
 
1.06 Subject to a number of conditions, including the seriousness of 
the facts of the particular case, s.2(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1951 
                                                 
16  For example ss.10 and 11 of the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851 which 
deal with the jurisdiction of a District Court judge to take a complaint and 
issue a summons, and to issue a warrant in lieu of a summons in the case of 
an indictable offence.  The Summary Jurisdiction Act 1857 sets out the 
procedure for a case stated from the District Court to the High Court.  
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(as amended)17 empowers the District Court to try summarily a 
number of indictable offences. The provision states: 
 
“The District Court may try summarily a person charged with 
a scheduled offence if— 
 
(a) the court is of opinion that the facts proved or 
alleged constitute a minor offence fit to be tried 
summarily, 
 
(b) the accused, on being informed by the court of his 
right to be tried with a jury, does not object to being 
tried summarily, and 
 
(c) the Director of Public Prosecutions consents to the 
accused being tried summarily for such offence.” 
 
1.07 It should be noted first that this provision only applies to those 
offences listed in the first schedule to the 1951 Act.18  Most 
significantly these included many of the main offences under the 
Larceny Acts 186119 and 1916.20  Other offences included: perjury; 
offences in the nature of public mischief;21 riot or unlawful 
assembly;22 some minor offences under the Malicious Damage Act 
1861;23 offences under the Forgery Act 1913;24 obtaining by false 
                                                 
17 Section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1951 was amended slightly by s.19 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 1967, sections 21(6) and 22 of the Criminal Law 
(Jurisdiction) Act 1976 and s.8 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1997. 
18  In addition, s.2(1)(b) of the 1951 Act provides for a mechanism whereby the 
Minister for Justice may make an order declaring an indictable offence to be 
a scheduled offence for the purposes of the Act.  It should be noted, 
however, that no order of this kind has yet been made by the Minister.  
19  This Act has been repealed by the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud) 
Offences Act 2001 save for ss.12-16, 24 and 25.  
20  This Act has been repealed by the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud) 
Offences Act 2001. 
21  The offence of effecting a public mischief is known to the common law of 
Ireland. See DPP (Vizzard) v Carew [1981] ILRM 91. 
22  See fn 29 below. 
23  See fn 28 below. 
24  This Act has been repealed by the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud) 
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pretences; assault occasioning actual bodily harm;25 indecent 
assault;26 and attempted carnal knowledge.  The number of offences 
in this category has been whittled down in recent years as 
replacement legislation for common law offences such as assault,27 
criminal damage28 and riot29 has come on stream. These new statutes 
have abandoned the 1951 model leaving it instead to the DPP to elect 
the mode of trial (the “hybrid” model explained at paragraph 1.11 
below).  Despite this trend, a trial regime very similar to that under 
the 1951 Act (whereby an accused retains a right to elect for trial by 
jury) has been adopted for the trial of the new offence of sexual 
assault under the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 199030 and 
more recently in the trial of offences under the Theft and Fraud 
Offences Act 2001.31  The latter creates a new offence of theft to 
replace the existing common law offences of larceny, embezzlement, 
and fraudulent conversion as well as bringing together in one 
consolidated statute the law on existing offences such as robbery and 
burglary.  New offences of forgery, counterfeiting and obtaining by 
deception also have been created.  Thus the 1951 model, or more 
accurately an amalgam thereof, continues to govern the trial 
procedure for a number of significant property offences.  
                                                                                                                  
Offences Act 2001. 
25   See fn 27 below. 
26  See fn 30 below. 
27  The common law offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm was 
abolished by s.28(1) of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997.  
A new offence of assault causing harm was created by virtue of s.3 of the 
1997 Act and can be tried summarily or on indictment. 
28  The Malicious Damage Act 1861 was repealed by s.15 of the Criminal 
Damage Act 1991, save for sections 35-38, 40, 41, 47, 48, 58 and 72.  The 
new offence of criminal damage created under the 1991 Act can be tried 
summarily or on indictment. 
29  The offence of riot was abolished by s.14 of the Criminal Justice (Public 
Order) Act 1994 which substituted a statutory offence of riot in place of the 
common law offence.  The statutory offence is triable only on indictment. 
30  Section 16 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990 amending 
s.2(1) of the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981.  The offence of “indecent 
assault” became known as “sexual assault” by virtue of s.2 of the Criminal 
Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990. 
31  Section 53 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud) Offences Act 2001 
closely mirrors the provisions of s.2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1951 as 
amended but imposes a heavier fine of £1,500 (€1,905). 
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1.08 If the offence falls within this category three other conditions 
must be satisfied in order for the offence to be tried summarily.  First, 
even if an individual is accused of a scheduled offence within the 
meaning of the 1951 Act, the court must be of the opinion that the 
facts proved or alleged constitute a minor offence fit to be so tried.  In 
State (O’Hagan) v Delap32 it was held that where a District Court 
judge has elected to try a case summarily and has embarked on the 
trial, circumstances may arise which indicate that the offence is not in 
fact minor in nature and in that event the judge would be obliged to 
send the case forward for trial on indictment.33  Secondly, and most 
significantly, the accused on being informed by the court of his or her 
right to be tried by jury must not object to being tried summarily.  
Finally, since the enactment of s.8 of the Criminal Justice 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997 the Director of Public 
Prosecutions must also consent to the accused being tried 
summarily.34 
 
1.09 Section 4(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1951 (as amended by 
s.17 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984) sets out the maximum 
sentences for crimes of this kind as being a term of imprisonment not 
exceeding 12 months, a fine not exceeding IR£1,000 (€1,270) or both 
fine and imprisonment.  It is clear that the legislature had to limit the 
sentence which could be handed down by the courts in these specific 
types of cases as it would be unfair if accused persons, having waived 
their right to jury trial, could still be given sentences as severe as the 
maximum sentence they could have received if they had gone before 
a jury. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32  State (O’Hagan) v Delap [1983] ILRM 241, 244. 
33  However, it does not appear to be open to a District Court judge to exercise 
this option at the sentencing stage.  In the subsequent case of Feeney v. 
District Justice Clifford [1989] IR 668 the Supreme Court held that once the 
District Court had accepted jurisdiction and convicted the applicant it could 
no longer decline jurisdiction even if facts emerged at the sentencing stage 
which indicated that the sentencing options were inadequate.   
34  Section 8 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997.  The 
requirement of the DPP’s consent for all cases was suggested by the 
Supreme Court in Feeney v District Justice Clifford [1989] IR 668, 679. 
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(c) Guilty Pleas 
 
1.10 If there is a plea of guilty then, in respect of most indictable 
offences, the case may be referred to the District Court for sentencing 
with the consent of the DPP.35  In such a case the District Court’s 
maximum power of sentencing is a fine not exceeding IR£1,000 
(€1,270) and/or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months.36 
 
 
(d) “Hybrid” Offences 
 
1.11 There is an increasing practice by which, when a statute 
creates an offence, it goes on to stipulate that the offence may be 
triable either summarily or on indictment, at the discretion of the 
DPP.  It follows that if an offence is prosecuted on indictment, the 
case will not be heard by the District Court unless a guilty plea is 
entered and the case is referred to the lower court for sentencing.  
Such a provision provides for either a lesser or greater maximum 
punishment, depending on which way the offence is being tried.  A 
typical example is s.4 of the Criminal Damage Act 1991, which 
states:  
  
“[A] person…who has anything in his custody…intending 
without lawful excuse to use it…. 
  
(a) to damage any property belonging to some other 
person…shall be guilty of an offence and shall be 
liable –  
 
(i) on summary conviction, to a fine not 
exceeding £1,000 [€1,270] or imprisonment for 
a term not exceeding 12 months or both, and  
 
                                                 
35  This is authorised by s.13 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967, as amended 
by s.17 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984. 
36 Section 13(3)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967 originally set out the 
maximum penalty which may be imposed by a District Court judge in such 
cases, but this was amended by s.17 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 which 
confines the District Court judge’s sentencing power to 12 months’ 
imprisonment and a fine of IR£1,000 (€1,270).  
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(ii) on conviction on indictment, to a fine not 
exceeding £10,000 [€12,700] or imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding 10 years or both.” 
 
1.12 The difference between this provision and s.2 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1951 is the fact that it is a cardinal feature of the 1951 Act 
that the accused, in addition to the DPP, has a right of election.  In 
other words, the accused may insist on being tried on indictment.  
This is in contrast to “hybrid” provisions like the Criminal Damage 
Act 1991 where the choice is exclusively that of the DPP. 
 
 
B. Article 38.2 of the Constitution: Fines  
 
1.13 Under Article 38 of the Constitution37 no one can be tried on a 
criminal offence without a jury save in three exceptional 
circumstances, one of which is the subject of this paper; namely, in 
the case of “minor offences”.38  The distinction between the 
constitutional concepts of minor and non-minor offences equates 
more or less with the statutory distinction drawn between summary 
and indictable offences.  As a general rule summary offences are also 
minor offences so that the Constitution is satisfied.  However in this 
Part the Commission is concerned with the exceptional and 
problematic instances of non-minor offences which are nevertheless 
triable without a jury.  If a statute stipulates a penalty for an offence 
which is non-minor but which is triable in the District Court without a 
jury then, as a result of Article 38, the statute is susceptible to a claim 
of unconstitutionality. 
 
1.14 The term “minor offence” is not defined in the Constitution.  
Therefore it has fallen to the judiciary in its role as interpreter of the 
Constitution to construe the term.  For the initial two decades or so 
                                                 
37 Article 38.2 states: “Minor offences may be tried by courts of summary 
jurisdiction”.  Article 38.5 states: “Save in the case of the trial of offences 
under s.2, s.3 or s.4 of this Article no person shall be tried on any criminal 
charge without a jury”. 
38 The other two exceptions are Article 38.3, which states that special courts 
may be established by law for the trial of offences in cases where the 
ordinary courts may be inadequate to secure the effective administration of 
justice and the preservation of public peace and order, and Article 38.4, 
which states that military courts may be established for the trial of offences 
against military law in certain circumstances. 
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after the coming into existence of the Constitution the issue attracted 
little attention from the courts.  Since the beginning of the 1960s, 
however, the test for whether an offence is minor or non-minor has 
been developed through a series of cases challenging various statutes 
which provide for the summary prosecution of alleged non-minor 
offences.  The courts have been obliged to consider the nature of 
minor offences and they have pointed to various factors which should 
be examined in order to decide whether an offence is minor or non-
minor.   
 
1.15 The leading case is Melling v Ó Mathghamhna39 in which the 
Supreme Court laid down a set of four criteria to be considered when 
deciding whether or not a particular offence is minor or non-minor.40  
The most significant of these were considered to be first, the severity 
of the punishment provided for by law, whether imprisonment or a 
fine and secondly, the moral quality of the acts required to constitute 
the offence in question thereby indicating that certain offences such as 
murder or rape could never be regarded as minor offences.  Other 
criteria listed in Melling relate to the state of the law at the time of the 
Constitution’s enactment and the state of public opinion at that time, 
although as Kelly41 notes these two factors may well be only different 
aspects of the same criterion.  It is with the first of these criteria - in 
practice the most important factor42 - that this section is concerned. 
 
 
Maximum Fine 
 
1.16 There has been no definitive judgment on the significant 
question of the maximum fine above which an offence ceases to be 
minor.  This is because in many of the cases which have come to 
court the monetary limits have been very much above any figure 
which in the light of contemporary financial values might be regarded 
as an acceptable limit.  
 
                                                 
39 [1962] IR 1. 
40 Kelly, Hogan and Whyte The Irish Constitution (3rd ed. Butterworths 1994) 
at 628-638. 
41  Ibid at 637. 
42  In Melling the Supreme Court agreed that this was the most important factor 
for consideration in determining whether an offence was minor. 
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1.17 In State (Rollinson) v Kelly43 Griffin J outlined what he took 
to be the accepted penalty for a summarily triable offence in the early 
1980s:  
 
“[I]n respect of the three years 1980 – 82, being the latest 
years in respect of which the bound volumes of the Acts of the 
Oireachtas as promulgated are available, a high proportion of 
the Acts in each year made provision for offences and for the 
penalties for such offences.  With the exception of the Family 
Law (Protection of Spouses and Children) Act 1981, in the 
case of every such Act in those three years there is provision 
for a fine not exceeding £500 [€635] on summary conviction, 
and under the Litter Act 1982, a person guilty of an offence is 
by s.15 liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding 
£800 [€1015.79]”44 
 
1.18 The majority of the Supreme Court in Rollinson held that a 
fine of €635 (IR£500) is minor and Griffin J went so far as to say that 
in his opinion “at the present time a fine of £500 (or indeed a sum 
fairly considerably in excess of that sum) would not be sufficient to 
take an offence out of the category of those which are minor offences 
and which are therefore triable in the District Court”.45   
 
1.19 In 1994 Kelly, Hogan and Whyte stated: “[T]o judge from a 
miscellaneous variety of recently enacted legislation the Oireachtas 
appears to be of the view that a fine of £1,000 [€1,270] is the 
maximum which may be imposed following summary conviction.”46  
This authority goes on to mention as examples, s.15(5)(a) of the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1992, the Table to the Environmental 
Protection Agency Act 1992 and s.9(2) of the Control Of Dogs 
(Amendment) Act 1992.  More recently, the Planning And 
Development Act 2000 allows for a maximum fine of €1,905 
(IR£1,500) on summary conviction for certain offences47 and in the 
Prevention Of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2001 the figure has crept 
                                                 
43 [1984] IR 248.  
44 Ibid at 263 – 264. 
45 State (Rollinson) v Kelly [1984] IR 248, 263. 
46 Kelly, Hogan and Whyte The Irish Constitution (3rd ed. Butterworths 1994) 
at 632. 
47 See ss.97(18) and 156(1)(a) of the Planning and Development Act 2000. 
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up to €3,000 (£2,362).  The same figure is provided for in the 
Competition Act 2002 for summary offences under the Competition 
Acts.  Further, as discussed in Chapter 6, the Health and Safety 
Authority has recommended an increased level of fine not exceeding 
IR£2,500 (€3,174) for summary health and safety offences.  These 
increments, though modest in their amounts reflect a steady upward 
trend in the amount of the maximum fine over and above the level of 
inflation.  
 
 
C. Article 38.2 of the Constitution: Prison Sentences 
 
1.20 For many years there had been no judicial statement giving a 
precise length of imprisonment which would remove an offence from 
the category of minor offences.  Even today, despite the fact that 
some more recent case law comes closer to specifying the acceptable 
maximum sentence for minor offences, the question still remains open 
to some extent.  Statements in this regard tend to be either very 
general, giving vague outlines, or refer only to the particular 
circumstances of the case in question.  A survey of the relevant case 
law was conducted in the Consultation Paper.48  All that can really be 
said with certainty is that an offence is minor where the punishment is 
less than six months imprisonment,49 whereas an offence is non-minor 
where the punishment is two years or more.50  
 
1.21 The most recent case on the subject is Mallon v Minister for 
Agriculture, Food and Forestry51 in which there is a dictum 
specifically stating that 12 months is an acceptable penalty for a 
minor offence.  In that case the applicant applied for orders of 
prohibition in respect of prosecutions for alleged contraventions of 
the European Communities (Control of Oestrogenic, Androgenic, 
Gestagenic and Thyrostatic Substances) Regulations 1988 and the 
European Communities (Control of Veterinary Medical Products and 
their Residues) Regulations 1990.  One of the applicant’s arguments 
was based on the contention that imprisonment for a term “not 
                                                 
48  Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper on Penalties for Minor 
Offences (LRC CP 18-2002) at paragraphs 3.02-3.09. 
49  Conroy v Attorney General [1965] IR 411. 
50  Mallon v Minister for Agriculture, Food and Forestry [1996] 1 IR 517. 
51  Ibid. 
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exceeding two years” for a summary offence, as provided for by the 
1990 Regulations, was repugnant to the Constitution.  In the High 
Court Costello J accepted this submission of repugnancy.  On appeal 
this point was conceded by the respondents so it was not argued 
before the Court that the sentence set out in the 1988 Regulations 
namely, one year, was unconstitutional.  Although the Supreme Court 
did not expressly rule on this point, as it was not relevant to the 
appeal, it seems to have been implicitly accepted by the Court and the 
parties to the action that a penalty of two years imprisonment for a 
minor offence was unconstitutional and that one year was not.  The 
only judicial comment expressly on this issue however was an obiter 
dictum by Barron J where he said that “a penalty of one year’s 
imprisonment would not have infringed the provisions of Article 38 
of the Constitution”.52  In the circumstances one can say that the 
Supreme Court in Mallon seems to have been of the opinion that one 
year’s imprisonment is a valid sentence for minor offences.53   
 
1.22 This view was supported, though again the point was not 
argued, by Moriarty J in Meagher v O’Leary54 (where the charges 
were brought under the same regulations as in Mallon) where he 
stated:  
 
“It is uncontested in argument, and indeed was set forth in the 
Supreme Court judgments in the Mallon case supra, that a 
maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment for a single 
offence takes that offence beyond the category of a minor one, 
whereas a maximum penalty of one year’s imprisonment does 
not…”55 
 
1.23 As to legislative practice one should note that two of the most 
recent pieces of legislation to come from the Oireachtas containing 
provisions for summary conviction, the Illegal Immigrants 
(Trafficking) Act 2000 and the Prevention Of Corruption 
(Amendment) Act 2001, provide that the maximum sentence which 
may be given on a summary conviction for an offence under the Acts 
                                                 
52  Mallon v Minister for Agriculture, Food and Forestry [1996] 1 IR 517, 542. 
53 See Casey Constitutional Law in Ireland (3rd ed. Sweet & Maxwell 2000) at 
320.  
54 [1998] 1 ILRM 211. 
55  Ibid at 218. 
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is 12 months.  These penalties are then in line with the Supreme Court 
interpretation which seems to be implicit in Mallon.  For the purposes 
of this Report therefore the Commission adopts the view that a minor 
offence is an offence which attracts a penalty of not more than one 
year’s imprisonment.  
 21
 
CHAPTER 2:  THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE 
REAPPRAISED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.01 In this chapter the current permissible maximum prison 
sentence for a minor offence is discussed in more detail.  As noted in 
Chapter 1, current constitutional wisdom would suggest that a 
sentence of 12 months imprisonment would not take an offence out of 
the minor category.  However it is open to serious question whether 
this is an appropriate sanction for an offence classified as “minor”.  In 
the Consultation Paper the Commission advanced two arguments in 
relation to this point.  First of all it is wildly out of line with modern-
day perceptions of justice to regard a fine of €3,000 (IR£2,363) as 
calling for a jury trial while not according this protection where a 
prison sentence of 12 months is involved.  This seems a clear 
anomaly.  Even disregarding for a moment the loss of liberty and 
other adverse consequences such as loss of employability and 
reputation which flow from a prison term, the financial implications 
alone of imprisonment for 12 months far exceed those of a €3,000 
(IR£2,363) fine.56  All in all there is little equivalence between the 
two penalties.  Secondly to classify a 12 month prison term as a 
suitable penalty for a minor offence is to disregard the comprehensive 
restriction on an individual’s liberty necessitated by a prison term.  
These arguments are further bolstered by the central position 
occupied by jury trial in our constitutional and legal system, which 
will be considered now followed by a more detailed examination of 
the arguments in relation to an individual’s right to liberty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56  See Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper on Penalties for Minor 
Offences (CP18-2002) at 42-43. 
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A. The Importance of Jury Trial 
 
2.02 Trial by jury has been described by various eminent legal 
commentators as a “palladium of liberty”57 and “the lamp that shows 
that freedom lives”.58  In this jurisdiction, moreover, the ambiguity 
which surrounds its status as a constitutional right in England59 is put 
beyond any doubt by the express guarantee in Article 38.5 of the 1937 
Constitution that “no person shall be tried on any criminal charge 
without a jury.”  As it has been expressed in mandatory terms, this 
provision has been described as a “constitutional imperative” rather 
than a personal “right”.60  This may imply perhaps that an individual 
accused has no power to waive the right to jury trial.   
 
2.03 There is also a clear judicial preference for jury trial.  For 
instance in the locus classicus on jury trial, de Burca v Attorney 
General,61 Henchy J said: 
 
“There is no doubt that the primary aim of s.5 of Article 38 in 
mandating trial by jury for criminal offences other than minor 
ones… is to ensure that every person charged with such an 
offence will be assured of a trial in due course of law by a 
group of laymen who, chosen at random from a reasonably 
diverse panel of jurors drawn from the community, will 
produce a verdict of guilty or not guilty free from the risks 
inherent in a trial conducted by a judge or judges only, and 
which will therefore carry with it the assurance of both 
correctness and public acceptability that may be expected 
from the group verdict of such a representative cross section 
of the community.”62 
 
                                                 
57  Blackstone Commentaries Vol IV (1776) at 349. 
58  Devlin Trial by Jury (London Stevens 1966) at 164. 
59  Darbyshire “The Lamp That Shows That Freedom Lives - Is it Worth the 
Candle?” [1991] Crim LR 740, 742-744. 
60  See the comments of Henchy J in Holohan v Donohue [1986] ILRM 250, 
256: “[Trial by jury] is not only preferred but made mandatory for the trial of 
non-minor offences…” 
61  [1976] IR 38. 
62  Ibid at 74. Emphasis added. 
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2.04 More recently in D v DPP,63 a case admittedly concerning 
pre-trial prejudicial newspaper coverage, Denham J stated that “on the 
hierarchy of constitutional rights there is no doubt that the applicant’s 
right to fair procedures is superior to the community’s right to 
prosecute”, commenting further that “fair procedures incorporates the 
requirement of trial by a jury.”64  Finlay CJ in D also expressed 
confidence in the “robust common sense of juries” while Hamilton P 
in Z,65 another pre-trial publicity case, remarked: “I too share the 
confidence our judicial system has in juries.”66  
 
2.05 The considerable research which has already been carried out 
in Britain into the scope of the right to jury trial was also instructive 
in considering the benefits of trial by jury.  Much of this research was 
carried out in the course of the British debate on either-way offences, 
a summary of which was included in some detail in the Consultation 
Paper.67  The Commission notes the differences between the District 
Court in Ireland and the magistrates’ courts in England, in particular 
the fact that the former is presided over by trained lawyers while the 
latter is mostly comprised of lay persons who are advised as to the 
law by a court clerk.  However the focus of these studies is the jury 
itself rather than the quality of the alternative.  Thus, despite these 
differences between the lower courts in the two jurisdictions, the 
research findings shine some light on the reasons that motivate some 
accused to prefer trial by jury. 
 
2.06 The British studies show that the reasons why an accused may 
wish to opt for trial by jury vary considerably.  It is possible that some 
defendants elect trial by jury purely as a delaying tactic in order to 
maximise the time spent on remand or to increase the likelihood that 
key prosecution witnesses do not attend.  (At the moment, the Circuit 
Court lists are short and so no particular delay would be encountered 
by electing for a jury trial.  If this situation were to change, obviously 
delaying tactics would be an issue.)  Others, however, genuinely 
perceive it to offer a fairer and fuller trial.  For example a 1992 
                                                 
63  [1994] 2 IR 465. 
64  Ibid at 442. 
65  [1994] 2 ILRM 481. 
66  Ibid at 493. 
67  See Chapter 5 of the Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper on 
Penalties for Minor Offences (CP 18-2002). 
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British study conducted by Hedderman and Moxon68 found that a 
substantial number of defendants chose to be dealt with at the Crown 
Court because they did not trust magistrates to give due weight to 
their case. An earlier study by Riley and Vennard69 also found that 
those defendants who chose jury trial did so because they intended to 
contest the case and viewed the Crown Court as offering a better 
chance of acquittal and this belief would appear to be borne out by the 
statistics in England.70  Two points should be made here.  First, it 
cannot be assumed that Irish defendants would share similar 
perceptions about jury trial.  Secondly, it is important to note that 
these are mere perceptions with little or no means of verifying 
whether they are well founded.  Indeed Ashworth has commented of 
these studies:  
 
“[The research findings] are strongly favourable to Crown 
Court trial in terms of the fairness of its procedure. The 
impression given is that the Crown Court looks into cases 
more thoroughly and allows more time for putting the case 
and examining the evidence, whereas Magistrates’ Courts 
operate at too great a speed and tend to give undue weight to 
the word of police witnesses.  These are mere opinions, 
though they have been reaffirmed by all research projects on 
the point.”71   
 
2.07 In any event it is fair to say that in an objective sense trial by 
jury is slower and more thorough.  There is usually: representation by 
a solicitor and counsel; advance disclosure of the prosecution case 
including witness statements in the Book of Evidence;72 a more 
                                                 
68  Hedderman and Moxon Magistrates’ Court or Crown Court? Mode of Trial 
Decision and Sentencing (British Research Study No. 125 1992) at vi-vii. 
69  Riley and Vennard Triable Either-Way Cases: Crown Court or Magistrates’ 
Court? (British Research Study No. 98 1988) at iii. 
70  British Consultation Paper  Determining Mode of Trial in Either Way Cases 
(July 1998) at paragraph 9. 
71  Ashworth The Criminal Process (1st ed. London 1994) at 246-7.  Emphasis 
added. 
72  Save for certain types of summary offence (such as drunken driving), it is 
only where the accused is to be tried on indictment that the prosecution is 
bound by statute (s.6(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967) to furnish in 
advance details of the evidence to be adduced against him.  See further 
Dwyer “The Duty of Disclosure in Criminal Proceedings” (1993) 3(1) ICLJ 
66. 
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thorough explanation of the legal principles applied by the judge; 
(both on matters relating to the admissibility of evidence and in the 
summing up); and importantly a full verbatim record of the 
proceedings which means errors of law are much more easily 
detectable.  
 
2.08 One of the most important benefits is derived from the 
division of labour between the judge and jury as arbiters of fact and 
law respectively.  In a trial conducted by a judge alone the vital 
distinction between the admissibility of evidence and the weight 
which should be attributed to it may become blurred.  Whereas in a 
jury trial the question of the admissibility of evidence is decided in 
their absence by means of a “trial within a trial”, in trials without a 
jury a judge cannot determine questions of admissibility without first 
hearing the evidence upon which they have to rule.  Thus if previous 
convictions or alleged admissions are found to be inadmissible judges 
are expected to put these out of their minds as they assume the role of 
trier of fact.  Greer and White73 have argued in this regard that “[i]t 
would be very difficult for a judge genuinely not to be influenced by 
the fact that an accused has confessed even though the circumstances 
of the confession rendered it inadmissible.”  Moreover, in a jury trial, 
even if the item of evidence is ruled admissible, the separate functions 
performed by the judge and jury mean that it is still open to defence 
counsel to cast doubt in the jury’s minds over the weight to be 
attributed to it.  It may be more difficult to convince judges sitting 
alone as to the poor probative value of the evidence when they have 
already determined that the circumstances were such as to render it 
admissible.  However careful the judge sitting alone may be to be 
mindful of this distinction, the reiteration of the respective roles of the 
judge and jury in respect of law and facts helps to emphasise the 
perception of their diverse roles. 
 
2.09 The separation of powers between judge and jury is also 
valuable in testing the credibility of witnesses. As Greer and White 
observe, “whereas a judge’s legal training will lead him to 
concentrate on inconsistencies or the lack of them, a jury will take an 
overall view of a witness bearing in mind his/her demeanour, attitude 
and so on.”74  Judges may also be required to warn themselves as to 
                                                 
73  Greer and White Abolishing the Diplock Courts (The Cobden Trust 1986) at 
11-12, quoted in Charleton and McDermott “Constitutional Aspects of Non-
Jury Courts” (2000) Bar Rev 106, 107.  
74  Ibid.  
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the dangers of convicting upon the uncorroborated evidence of an 
accomplice.  This may cast a perception of doubt over the efficacy of 
the warning despite the scrupulous conscientiousness of the judge.  
Another consideration with a judge-only trial is that there may be an 
element of case-hardening to which judges sitting alone may be 
prone.  Trial by jury provides a mechanism by which each case is 
heard on its individual merits by a fresh tribunal of fact.75 
  
2.10 It is important also to consider the role played by the jury in 
the criminal justice system.  As noted in the Consultation Paper, “the 
jury system embraces values reaching beyond the perceptions of 
accused persons such as the participation of the public in the criminal 
justice system and confidence of the general public in that system.”76 
The jury system promotes the ideal of community involvement in the 
criminal justice system and brings people of both sexes, all ages and 
from various walks of life and social backgrounds to the 
administration of criminal justice.  The jury as a “little parliament”77 
can be seen as the ultimate manifestation of participatory democracy.  
Personal involvement by the public in determining someone’s guilt or 
innocence also gives people confidence in the fairness of the system. 
As Cornish78 has noted: 
 
“ …the system has the intrinsic advantage that in drawing 
upon a steady stream of ordinary citizens it is not only 
educating them in the work of the courts, but also, since they 
are generally satisfied with their own performance, sending 
them back to their ordinary lives with a sense of the fairness 
and propriety of the judicial process in their country.”79  
                                                 
75  For a list of advantages of a jury trial, albeit in the context of discussion on 
non-jury courts, see in Charleton and McDermott “Constitutional Aspects of 
Non-Jury Courts” (2000) Bar Rev 106, 107. 
76  Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper on Penalties for Minor 
Offences (CP 18-2002) at paragraph 5.31. 
77  See Devlin Trial by Jury (London Stevens 1966) at 164: “Each jury is a little 
parliament.  The jury sense is the parliamentary sense. I cannot see one dying 
and the other surviving.  The first object of any tyrant in Whitehall would be 
to make Parliament utterly subservient to his will; and the next to overthrow 
or diminish trial by jury, for no tyrant could afford to leave a subject’s 
freedom in the hands of twelve of his countrymen.” 
78  Cornish The Jury (Harmondsworth Penguin 1968). 
79  Ibid at 255. 
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2.11 This line of argument is even stronger here than in Britain 
where there are considerable numbers of lay justices.80  The 
ideological role of the jury should not be dismissed lightly.  To the 
New Zealand Law Commission for example, the “strong function 
which juries play in legitimising verdicts and maintaining public 
confidence in the criminal justice system” constituted an “important 
argument” which militated against altering the three-month threshold 
for entitlement to jury trial.81 
 
2.12 Despite the foregoing the jury has not been without its 
critics.82  Indeed among their number in Ireland can be found former 
High Court Judge Rory O’Hanlon who compares the system 
unfavourably with trial by judge alone.83  One of  his main criticisms 
relates to the fact that the jury is not required to justify how they 
arrived at their decision; while a judgment delivered by a judge may 
be scrutinised by an appellate court there is much less scope for 
overturning a jury verdict unless no reasonable jury could have 
arrived at the same conclusion.  This of course is a substantial 
consideration.  O’Hanlon also makes the point that, unlike the 
members of a jury, a judge has been trained throughout his legal 
career to leave personal considerations aside and to look at cases 
objectively and impartially.  As juries are not trained in this manner 
they may on occasion return perverse verdicts.  While this is 
undoubtedly a valid point there is very little in the way of evidence to 
support this claim as, save in the case of a miscarriage of justice, it is 
extremely difficult to know whether the “right” verdict has been 
reached.  Further, despite these criticisms, it is clear from the above 
that trial by jury has much to commend it and does offer defendants 
significant advantages over trial by judge alone.  The presence of a 
jury not only involves citizens in the system of justice but imposes a 
discipline on the judge and advocates to present cases in an orderly 
and understandable fashion.  
                                                 
80  See the comments of Darbyshire in this regard “The Lamp That Shows That 
Freedom Lives - Is it Worth the Candle?” [1991] Crim LR 740, 746. 
81  New Zealand Law Commission Juries in Criminal Trials (NZLC 69-2001) 
at paragraph 78. 
82  See for example Darbyshire op cit.  For a discussion of the arguments on 
both sides of the debate see Findlay and Duff (eds.) The Jury Under Attack 
(Butterworths 1988). 
83  O’Hanlon “The Sacred Cow of Trial by Jury” (1990-1992) 25-27 Ir Jur (NS) 
57. 
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B. The Right to Liberty 
 
2.13 Article 40.4.1 of the Constitution grants the citizen a general 
guarantee of personal liberty in its provision that “[n]o citizen shall be 
deprived of his personal liberty save in accordance with law.”  As 
evidenced by the firm language used by the Supreme Court in cases 
such as O’Callaghan84 and Ryan85 there can be little doubt that a 
citizen’s right to liberty is a fundamental right and as such one which 
should be accorded the most stringent protection.  Obversely it can be 
said that the deprivation of this fundamental right brought about by 
the imposition of a prison term is, as the Whittaker Report86 noted, the 
gravest penalty known to our society today. 
 
2.14 Indeed the right to personal liberty is not the only right which 
is withdrawn or restricted by virtue of a term of imprisonment. As the 
Whittaker Committee put it in their Report:87  
 
“The ordinary citizen, with his own home, free to come and go 
as he pleases, able to choose his company and pastimes, finds 
it difficult to visualise the lot of a prisoner, confined within a 
forbidding perimeter and bleak environment, shut up alone in 
a cell for sixteen hours of every day, his movement restricted 
at every turn by locks and bars, his daily regime one of utter 
predictability and barely tolerable monotony, deprived of 
access to a toilet at night, under constant supervision and thus 
enjoying no privacy, his correspondence censored, his visits 
regulated and supervised, no time in private with loved 
ones…” 
 
2.15 These aspects of imprisonment were highlighted more 
recently by the Government Report on the Management of Offenders: 
A Five Year Plan which noted that “the bottom line is that 
imprisonment removes totally the right to free movement which is 
                                                 
84  People v O’Callaghan [1966] IR 501. 
85   Ryan v DPP [1989] IR 399. 
86  Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Penal System (Dublin Stationery 
Office 1985). 
87  Ibid at paragraph 4.2. 
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one of the most valued of human rights and also considerably limits 
various other rights such as the right to unrestricted communication 
with others.”88  The severity of imprisonment as a form of punishment 
is also implicitly recognised by the widespread international assent to 
the principle of restraint on the use of imprisonment.  For example 
Resolution VIII of the Eighth United Nations Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders states that 
“imprisonment should be used as a sanction of last resort”.89  
Similarly the Council of Europe has declared a policy of encouraging 
the use of non-custodial sentences and reserving custodial sentences 
for the most serious types of offence.90  In this jurisdiction the 
principle has been given statutory expression in the Children Act 2001 
with regard to young offenders.91   
 
2.16 In the light of the above, an argument might be made along 
the lines that an accused should have a right to jury trial before any 
term of imprisonment is imposed by a court.  However, as noted in 
the Consultation Paper, the Commission does not feel able (at the 
present moment) to make this recommendation in view of the possible 
implications  that such a proposal would have for the criminal justice 
system as it currently operates.  Instead it was felt that the restriction 
on a citizen’s liberty which a sentence of more than six months 
represents should only be visited on a person following a jury trial 
since trial by jury is the highest form of protection recognised by the 
Constitution.  
 
 
C. Comparisons with Other Jurisdictions 
 
2.17 Comparisons with other common law jurisdictions with 
analogous constitutional arrangements for non-jury trial for minor 
offences lend support to the Commission’s argument concerning the 
severity of a sentence of 6 to 12 months for a minor offence.  In the 
US, where the equivalent of a minor offence is known as a “petty 
                                                 
88  Department of Justice The Management of Offenders: A Five Year Plan 
(Dublin Stationery Office 1994) at 17. 
89  Paragraph 5(e). 
90  European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures 1992.  
91  Section 96(2) lays down the principle that “a period of detention should be 
imposed only as a measure of last resort”. Section 143(1) gives specific 
statutory effect to this principle.  
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offence”, the 1975 Supreme Court case of Muniz v Hoffman92 held 
that for minor crimes a sentence of imprisonment for longer than six 
months was constitutionally impermissible unless the defendant had 
been given the opportunity of a jury trial.  Section 24(e) of the New 
Zealand Bill Of Rights Act 1990 allows for a right of trial by jury for 
an offence punishable by imprisonment for a term in excess of three 
months (although as it happens the general status of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights is such that this provision does not necessarily 
invalidate statutes which provide for summary trial of a crime with a 
higher penalty than three months).  In Australia those judges who 
have considered the point have varied in their opinions as to the 
appropriate boundaries for exclusion from the right to jury trial. Their 
views range from the position that any sentence of imprisonment at 
all should attract trial by jury to the position that summary trials are 
permissible up to a maximum term of 12 months. 
 
2.18 Reference to the British debate on either-way offences has 
already been made. However there is another category of less serious 
offences which are only triable summarily in magistrates’ courts. 
These offences are subject to a current maximum term of 
imprisonment of six months as provided for by s.27(1) of the 
Criminal Law Act 1977.  It should be noted here that the latest 
Government White Paper Justice for All published in July 2002 has 
recommended that magistrates’ sentencing powers be increased 
possibly up to 18 months.93  An analogy can also be drawn with the 
sheriff courts in Scotland.  In summary proceedings, a sheriff’s 
sentencing powers are restricted to six months imprisonment (or 12 
months in the case of a second or subsequent offence of violence or 
dishonesty). 
 
 
D. Delay and Costs Implications 
 
2.19 Reaction to the Consultation Paper at the seminar and in 
written submissions received by the Commission focused on the 
                                                 
92  422 US 454. 
93  “We will legislate to increase magistrates’ sentencing powers to 12 months, 
and to allow us to increase them up to a maximum of 18 months, depending 
on the results of evaluations, and taking account of any necessary additional 
training requirements”: CJS: Justice for All London HMSO. 2002 (Cmnd 
5563) at paragraph 4.19. 
 31
practical effects of the provisional proposal to reduce to six months 
the maximum sentence which can be imposed for a minor offence in 
the District Courts.  It was submitted that the effect of any such 
change in the law would be a substantial increase in the number of 
cases being sent forward for jury trial in the Circuit Court which 
would in turn have important costs and delay implications.  Delays for 
criminal cases in the Circuit Court in Dublin are currently between 
four and six weeks.  It was suggested that these may be exacerbated 
should the proposals come into effect.  Delay is always an enemy of 
justice and it is important to bear in mind the requirements under the 
Constitution and the fair trial provisions of Article 6 of the European 
Convention.  However, as discussed below, the Commission does not 
believe its proposals will inexorably lead to a deluge of cases in the 
Circuit Court.   
 
 
(a) Number of Additional Circuit Court Cases 
 
2.20 An obvious starting point in attempting to ascertain the 
consequences for the Circuit Court caseload of any reduction in 
District Court sentencing powers is the available empirical evidence 
on current sentencing in the District Court.  At the moment the Court 
deals with approximately 90% or more of all criminal cases.94  As 
outlined in Chapter 1, it is possible to further divide those indictable 
cases which are tried summarily into three sub-categories, namely: 
“hybrid” offences, which are triable summarily or on indictment at 
the discretion of the DPP; offences scheduled under s.2(2) of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1951 as amended;95 and guilty pleas which are 
referred with the consent of the DPP to the District Court for 
sentencing.96  It will also be recalled from Chapter 1 that the 
Commission is not suggesting any limit on a District Court judge’s 
sentencing powers where an accused consents to summary trial or 
where there is a guilty plea; thus the latter two categories will not be 
affected by the provision.  These two categories represent offences in 
which accused persons have either waived their rights to trial by jury 
                                                 
94  Statistics for 2001 indicate that the District Court heard 386,075 summary 
cases and 50,431 indictable cases.  The District Court returned 8,834 cases 
for trial on indictment. 
95  As amended by s.8 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1997. 
96  Section 13 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967. 
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in the Circuit Court or pleaded guilty before the Circuit Court and 
therefore do not fall within the ambit of the recommendation.  As a 
result, in seeking an approximation of the additional burden on the 
caseload of the Circuit Court which might result from the change 
proposed, it is necessary to combine the numbers of summary 
offences and “hybrid” offences which currently attract sentences 
within the 6 to 12 month range.  These figures will obviously be 
subject to different prevailing circumstances, such as changing 
demographic trends and the crime rate but nevertheless may provide 
an indication of the potential impact of a reduction of the maximum 
penalty. 
 
2.21 Unfortunately national statistics on District Court sentencing 
patterns are not available in the requisite level of detail.  However, 
some data on sentencing in Dublin and Limerick in 2001 is available 
from the Courts Service by virtue of the Criminal Case Tracking 
System.97  While these statistics may provide an indication of how 
frequently sentences of over six months are imposed in the District 
Court, it is important to note that these figures may not accurately 
represent sentencing practices in other areas.  In any event, the 
statistics provided by the Courts Service indicate that the number of 
offences in respect of which the offender received an immediate 
sentence of imprisonment in District Courts within the Dublin 
Metropolitan Area in 2001 was 3,665.  Of these, the figures which 
relate to sentences of imprisonment of over six months can be 
categorised as follows:  
                                                 
97  The Criminal Case Tracking System (CCTS) is part of the Courts Service 
Information Technology Strategic Plan to implement modern technologies in 
all areas on courts business and operates in the Dublin Metropolitan and 
Limerick District Courts.  CCTS is an Oracle Relational Database and is 
designed to utilise modern database capabilities to allow the organisation to 
achieve a centralised and uniformed collection of data on criminal cases.  
CCTS was completed and implemented in 2001.  The system enables court 
staff and management to record and monitor the progress of criminal court 
cases, showing the complete lifecycle of these cases. 
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Table 2.1:  Sentencing Information: Dublin Metropolitan 
District98 2001.  Offences by Category: Immediate 
Sentence of Imprisonment of Over Six Months99 
 
Offence Summons Charge 
Sheet 
Total 
Summary 17 171 188 
Indictable triable summarily 4 342 346 
Triable summarily at DPP’s 
direction 
3 111 114 
Total 24 624 648 
 
2.22 As the Commission’s proposal would affect only summary 
offences and offences which are triable summarily at the DPP’s 
direction, it would appear that 302 (188 + 114) out of the 648 cases in 
which a sentence of 6 to 12 months was imposed would fall to be 
dealt with by the Circuit Court.  Assuming that sentencing practice 
has not changed significantly since 2001, this would amount to 302 
extra Circuit Court cases per year in the Dublin Area.   
 
2.23 Sentencing information for Limerick for 2001 indicates that a 
lesser number of offences may be affected.  The number of offences 
which received an immediate sentence of imprisonment was 323.  
The relevant figures for present purposes namely, those pertaining to 
sentences of imprisonment of over six months, can be further broken 
down as follows:  
                                                 
98  The following District Court areas are not included: Children’s Court; 
Kilmainhaim; Tallaght. 
99  Source: Courts Service. 
 
 34
 
Table 2.2:  Sentencing Information: Limerick100 2001.  
Offences by Category: Immediate Sentence of 
Imprisonment of Over Six Months101 
 
Offence Summons Charge 
Sheet 
Total 
Summary 1 6 7 
Indictable triable summarily 0 24 24 
Triable summarily at DPP’s 
direction 
2 27 29 
Total 3 57 60 
 
2.24 As can be seen from Table 2.2., the number of cases in the 
relevant categories corresponds approximately to 36 (7+29) extra 
Circuit Court cases in Limerick per year.   
 
2.25 Should the District Court sentencing powers be limited to six 
months, a number of comments can be made in interpreting these 
figures to deduce an impression of the additional burden on the 
caseload of the Circuit Court.  In the first place, the figures given 
include sentences of the appropriate length whether given following a 
trial or a guilty plea.  In a strong majority of cases the accused pleads 
guilty (76% of cases disposed of by the Circuit Court in 2001 
comprised cases in which a plea of guilty was entered).102  However, 
even in those cases, sentencing would place demands upon Circuit 
Court time, the amount depending upon the stage at which the guilty 
plea was entered.  Another factor to bear in mind is that the issue is 
not simply one of counting up how many offenders are sentenced to 6 
to 12 months, as in the figures just cited.  These figures show only 
those cases in which the offender had pleaded guilty or was 
convicted.  However if the District Court’s power of sentencing were 
reduced to six months then there would be a number of other cases in 
which the DPP would take the view that the offence was so serious 
that it would have to be tried in the Circuit Court.  In a good 
proportion of such cases the accused would be acquitted.  The 
                                                 
100  District Court Area of Limerick. 
101  Source: Courts Service. 
102  Ibid. 
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relevance of this for present purposes is that under the present regime 
there is no equivalent figure for these cases which can be considered 
alongside the figures cited above.  Lastly, and perhaps most 
importantly, this figure represents current sentencing practice.  It is to 
be hoped that this Report may prompt a re-examination of this area by 
sentencing judges in the District Court who may begin to 
reconceptualise the tariffs for a minor offence.  If this were to occur 
then the concerns expressed as to the additional burden which would 
be placed on the Circuit Court would, to some extent, be met by the 
aforementioned change in sentencing practice.   
 
 
(b) Costs Implications 
 
2.26 In any event the additional time and cost of conducting a trial 
in the Circuit Court requires careful consideration.  From the 
information garnered at the Commission’s seminar it is reasonable to 
assume that a relatively uncomplicated case involving only a couple 
of witnesses could be heard in a couple of hours in the District Court.  
In the Circuit Court on the other hand, the trial of an equivalent case 
is likely to run into a second day’s hearing.  The fallout may therefore 
be significant in terms of the additional days for which the Circuit 
Court would be required to sit and, consequently, in terms of the 
additional Circuit Court Judges which may need to be appointed.  
Extra costs would also be incurred by the Courts Service in terms of 
an increased demand placed on human and physical resources.  
 
2.27 It is also of paramount importance to consider the additional 
expenditure required to defend an action in the Circuit Court where 
the majority of defendants are in receipt of legal aid.  Fees between 
the two courts differ considerably.  If one assumes that a defendant 
will usually be represented in the District Court by a solicitor only but 
in the Circuit Court by both a solicitor and counsel, then it is possible 
to estimate the additional cost to the Exchequer of running a case in 
the higher court.  A solicitor is paid a €208.73 (IR£164.39) fee for 
appearing in the District Court.  In contrast, in the Circuit Court a 
solicitor is given an initial brief fee of  €1,184 (IR£932) and the same 
amount is also given in brief fees to counsel.  A second day in the 
Circuit Court (assuming as stated above an average trial would 
continue into a second day) would require a refresher fee of €432.16 
(£340.35) for the solicitor and €592 (£466.24) for counsel.  Thus if 
the trial continues into the second day the total bill for a defendant’s 
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legal aid in the Circuit Court is €3,392.16 (IR£2,671.54).  This is an 
additional €3,183.43 (IR£2,507.15) as compared with District Court 
costs.  While the costs incurred by the State in bringing additional 
prosecutions in the Circuit Court as opposed to the District Court are 
less amenable to calculation given that salaried State solicitors are 
retained by the Office of the DPP, the fees cited above for defence 
counsel in the Circuit Court would be mirrored on the prosecution 
side.  It is important to consider as well the extra demands which 
would be placed on the resources of the DPP’s Office.  Allowing for 
such hidden costs, the additional amount would have to be in the 
order of  €10,000.  Moreover this figure does not take into account the 
cost of the judge, the court and its staff. 
 
2.28 This figure invites an enquiry into the number of additional 
jury trials in respect of which these extra costs would be incurred.  
However, when factors such as those discussed in paragraph 2.22 are 
taken into account, most notably the number of guilty pleas and the 
prospect that the sentencing maxima are reconceptualised by District 
Court judges, it appears impossible to estimate with any accuracy the 
additional costs which would be incurred.  In any event, in 
considering the costs implications which may flow from the 
recommendation, it is worth reemphasising that a citizen’s right to 
liberty is a fundamental right and as such one which should be 
accorded the most stringent protection. 
 
2.29 There is one further objection to a proposal to reduce the 
District Court’s sentencing power which has been suggested to the 
Commission.  This criticism is directed at the workability of any such 
provision bearing in mind that the District Court would retain a 
discretion to impose consecutive sentences of up to 24 months.103  
The significance of this power could arise from the fact that in many 
criminal cases there are a number of different charges or counts 
brought against the accused, arising out of separate incidents.  Often a 
multiple offender will receive what is effect a “discount” for bulk 
offending when he or she asks the court to take a number of counts 
                                                 
103  Section 5 of the Criminal Justice Act 1951 (as amended by s.12(1) of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1984) provides: “[W]hen a sentence of imprisonment is 
passed on any person by the District Court, the court may order that the 
sentence shall commence at the expiration of any other term of imprisonment 
to which that person has been previously sentenced, so that where two or 
more sentences passed by the District Court are ordered to run consecutively 
the aggregate term of imprisonment shall not exceed two years.” 
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into consideration.  The significant point is that the District Court 
judge retains a discretion to impose consecutive sentences provided 
that each of these charges arise from separate incidents.  It has been 
suggested that if a six month maximum were introduced District 
Court judges might exercise their discretion to sentence consecutively 
in such a manner that a person convicted of a number of separate 
offences would receive consecutive six month sentences in 
circumstances where otherwise they would have served their 
sentences concurrently.104  
 
2.30 It is, however, noteworthy that as a general principle of law 
sentences may not be extended by means of consecutive sentencing so 
as to render them disproportionate to the offence.  Therefore, where 
consecutive offences are imposed, the totality of the resulting 
punishment should be readjusted to reflect the overall gravity of the 
offending behaviour, the so-called “totality principle”.105  Moreover 
the Supreme Court in Meagher v O’Leary106 has already expressed 
strong disapproval of a practice whereby prosecution authorities 
artificially multiply charges in the hope of securing consecutive 
sentences. O’Flaherty J further noted that “for a judge to approbate 
such a course of conduct would… be a misuse of a discretion by him 
or her.” 
 
                                                 
104  Another possibility is that sentences may be increased through the adoption 
of consecutive sentences of six months for offences arising from the same 
criminal “transaction” whereas previously concurrent sentences would have 
been imposed.  As a general rule concurrent sentences are ordinarily imposed 
when the offences arise from the same incident (the “one transaction rule”).  
In Meagher v O’Leary [1998] 4 IR 44 Moriarty J stated that “when a 
summary sentencing jurisdiction is being exercised in relation to what in 
essence amounts to a single criminal transaction, it is wrong in law that 
consecutive sentences should be imposed in respect of different summonses 
or charges clearly referable to that single transaction, in such a fashion as to 
render the aggregate sentence in excess of twelve months.” Moriarty J 
further remarked obiter that an appropriate test for determining whether the 
offences were separate and therefore whether consecutive sentences could be 
imposed in respect of different charges or summonses would be “whether or 
not an acquittal on a first alleged complaint would amount to a bar against 
the prosecution proceeding on second or subsequent complaints.” It is to be 
hoped that, in the event of such a practice growing up in the District Courts, 
the judicial principles thus developed would act as a useful touchstone.  
105  See O’Malley Sentencing Law and Practice (Round Hall Sweet and Maxwell 
2000) at para 6-89. 
106  [1998] 2 ILRM 481. 
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(c) Conclusion: View of the Majority 
 
2.31 The arguments are clearly well balanced.  The Commission is 
unanimous in its recommendation that ideally, the restriction on a 
citizen’s liberty represented by a term of imprisonment of 6 to 12 
months should only be visited on a person following a jury trial.   
 
2.32 However, at the present time the majority of the Commission 
feel unable to recommend legislation giving effect to this principle for 
two reasons.  The first relates to the lack of nationwide statistical data 
on the sentencing of offenders in the District Court which would 
permit the Commission to ascertain (with a reasonable degree of 
accuracy) the effect of such legislation, or indeed the frequency with 
which sentences of 6 to 12 months are currently imposed in the 
District Court in this jurisdiction.  Although the statistics available for 
Dublin and Limerick (admittedly District Courts with heavy 
caseloads) indicate that there is unlikely to be a huge influx of cases 
into the Circuit Court, the lack of data on sentencing in the country as 
a whole presents a significant handicap to any discussion on 
sentencing limits.  The majority of the Commission think it imprudent 
to make a directional recommendation in the absence of such data.  
Secondly, the Commission is of the view that a wider range of non-
custodial sanctions and measures should be made available to District 
Court judges prior to the implementation of any proposal to curtail 
their sentencing powers in respect of minor offences.  Although the 
Commission majority have ultimately favoured a non-directional 
recommendation in this area of reform, they remain firmly committed 
to the principle that a maximum level of 6 to 12 months is an 
inappropriate penalty for a minor offence.  They therefore exhort 
sentencing judges in the District Court to reconceptualise the 
sentencing maximum for minor offences. 
 
2.33 Therefore, at the present time, the majority of the Commission 
feel unable to recommend legislation which would impose a limit of 
six months on the District Court’s sentencing powers.  
 
 
(d) Conclusion: View of the Minority 
 
2.34 While the practical effect of a proposal to reduce the 
sentencing maximum for a minor offence cannot be described as 
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negligible, on the basis of the statistical information available the 
minority of the Commission does not consider the implications to be 
so overwhelming as to render any such proposal unworkable.  Further 
these implications do not appear so significant as to override the 
important principle identified earlier at paragraph 2.15, namely, that 
the restriction on a citizen’s liberty which a sentence of more than six 
months represents should only be visited on a person following a jury 
trial.    
 
2.35 The minority of the Commission therefore further recommends 
legislation along the following lines:  
 
“(1)  Without prejudice to s.5 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1951 as amended [consecutive terms of imprisonment], a 
District Court shall not have power to impose imprisonment 
for more than six months in respect of any one offence.” 
 
“(2)  Unless expressly excluded, subs.(1) shall apply even if 
the offence in question is one for which a person would 
otherwise be liable on summary conviction to imprisonment 
for more than six months”.107   
 
2.36 This provision would be subject to two exceptions.  First, 
those indictable offences triable summarily which are scheduled 
under s.2(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1951 as amended108 and in 
respect of which the accused has a right to insist upon a jury trial.  
Secondly, those indictable cases in which pleas of guilty have been 
entered and which have been referred with the consent of the DPP to 
the District Court for sentencing only.109  
 
2.37 It is important to emphasise though that in reaching these 
conclusions the Commission is not seeking (indirectly) to alter the 
Constitution.  The proposal is rather that, despite the constitutional 
requirement, District Court judges (majority view) or the legislature 
(minority view) would on policy grounds observe a self-denying 
                                                 
107  See s.27 of the English Criminal Law Act 1977. 
108  Section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1951 was amended slightly by  s.19 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 1967, ss.21(6) and 22 of the Criminal Law 
(Jurisdiction) Act 1976 and s.8 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1997. 
109  Section 13 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967. 
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ordinance.  While cognisant of the fact that its role does not extend to 
recommending constitutional amendments, the Commission 
nevertheless seeks to suggest to the All-Party Oireachtas Committee 
on the Constitution that the recommendation might be copper-
fastened by the only foolproof method, namely, a constitutional 
amendment.  The Commission also notes that the allocation of the 
jurisdiction as between the District Court and the Circuit Court is 
presently being reviewed by the Working Group on the Jurisdiction of 
the Courts.  The Commission hopes that the conclusions reached 
herein in relation to the appropriate maximum term which should be 
imposed for a minor offence could be considered in the broader 
context of this review.  In addition, it is noteworthy that the 
Government, while in no way attempting to pre-empt the 
recommendations of the Working Group, has set out a proposal in its 
Programme for Government to establish a single court for the trial of 
indictable offences.  It is possible that the Commission’s views may 
dovetail well with any development.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE REQUIREMENT TO GIVE 
REASONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.01 The hardship occasioned by a custodial sentence and the 
respect afforded the liberty of the citizen by the Irish constitutional 
and legal system has further led the Commission to recommend that 
there be a requirement that a District Court judge should give brief 
written reasons as to why a prison sentence rather than a non-
custodial sentence has to be imposed.110   
 
 
A. Arguments in Favour of Giving Reasons for a Sentencing 
Decision 
 
3.02 There are several arguments in favour of the introduction of a 
requirement to give reasons.  The Commission believes that the 
public has an interest in knowing the reasons behind sentencing 
decisions and, by countering any appearance of arbitrariness, public 
confidence in the criminal justice system may well be enhanced as a 
result.  A second advantage flowing from a duty to give reasons is 
that it may encourage more considered legal decisions.  In his classic 
article on this subject Thomas quotes from The Franks Report:111 
“[A] decision is apt to be better if the reasons for it have to be set out 
in writing because the reasons are then more likely to have been 
properly thought out.”112  More recently, Lord Justice Henry stated in 
the civil case of Flannery v Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd113 that “a 
requirement to give reasons concentrates the mind.  If it is fulfilled 
the resulting decision is much more likely to be soundly based on the 
                                                 
110  Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper on Penalties for Minor 
Offences (CP 18-2002) at paragraphs 6.29 and 9.3. 
111  The Franks Report 1957 (Cmnd 218) at paragraph 98. 
112  Thomas “Sentencing - The Case For Reasoned Decisions” [1963] Crim L R 
243, 247. 
113  [2000] 1 WLR 377. 
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evidence than if it is not.”114  Views along similar lines were 
expressed at the seminar.  A number of those who attended expressed 
the hope that the imposition of a requirement to give reasons would 
result in an improved standard of advocacy in the District Court and 
would encourage District Court judges to elicit more information 
from advocates before sentencing.  In this regard it is of interest to 
note that in 1992, as part of its recommendations to promote 
consistency in sentencing, the Council of Europe advocated that 
concrete reasons for sentencing decisions be given in Member States, 
particularly when a custodial sentence is imposed.115 
 
3.03 It is also salutary to note the impact which the Cawley116 
decision in Britain has had on the use of imprisonment by the courts 
for young fine defaulters.  In Cawley the High Court reinforced the 
statutory requirement laid down in s.1(5a)b of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1982 for the courts to articulate clearly the reasons why each fine 
enforcement measure had failed or had not been used before 
committing a young fine defaulter to jail. Simon Brown LJ stated : 
 
“[I]t must be possible to see from the face of the warrant (and 
register) why it is that… the justices have felt no alternative 
but to commit this young person to custody… the reasoning 
process must be gone through.  The reasons must be clearly 
capable of articulation.  They must indeed be articulated in 
open court.”117  
 
3.04 The judgment, coupled with a new “best practice” guide 
fortuitously issued about the same time by the Lord Chancellor’s 
Department,118 has had the effect that the number of fine defaulters 
                                                 
114  Ibid at 396. 
115  “E.1. Courts should in general state concrete reasons for imposing sentences.  
In particular specific reasons should be given when a custodial sentence is 
imposed”: Council of Europe Consistency in Sentencing Recommendation 
No. R (92) 17 Strasbourg 19 October 1992. 
116  R v Oldham Justices and another, ex parte Cawley [1997] QB 1; [1996] 1 
All ER 464.  
117  Ibid. 
118  In 1995 a Working Group was set up by the Magistrates’ Association, the 
Justices’ Clerks Society and the Lord Chancellor’s Department to study the 
enforcement of financial penalties.  It sought to identify ways of improving 
enforcement and produced a report in 1996 which highlighted good practice 
as well as giving guidance on fine enforcement. 
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received into prison has fallen sharply from its peak at 21,000 in 1994 
to around 5,000 in 1997 and 1998.119  Such findings lend strong 
support to the argument that an obligation to state the reasons for a 
decision can lead to greater care and fairness in judicial decision-
making.  
 
3.05 A cynical person might say that such an obligation could lead 
to an increased number of judicial reviews.  A more constructive way 
of viewing this is that the provision of reasons for a decision would 
mean that appellate and review courts would be better able to assess 
the appropriateness of the sentence imposed at first instance.  Indeed 
the utilitarian aspect of reasoned decision making was highlighted by 
Keane J in Golding v The Labour Court:120 
 
“[T]he determination by the Labour Court need not… take any 
particular form: what is essential is that the manner in which it 
[the determination] is expressed leaves no room for doubt as 
to the reasons which led to the decision, thus ensuring that 
neither the appellate nor the supervisory jurisdiction of this 
court is frustrated by an inadequate indication of reasons.”  
 
 
B. Constitutional Justice and Human Rights Obligations to 
Give Reasons 
 
3.06 Thus far this chapter has considered the policy arguments in 
favour of a duty to give reasons.  In this part it is noted that the 
recommendation made here is in fact merely an aspect of the general 
constitutional and human rights obligation to give reasons for a 
decision.  Prior to the entry into force of the Freedom Of Information 
Act 1997, a wide doctrine requiring administrative bodies to give 
reasons for their decisions had been deduced from the notion of 
constitutional justice.  Decisions such as The State (Creedon) v 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Tribunal121 and International 
Fishing Vessels Ltd v Minister for the Marine122 had brought Irish 
                                                 
119  See Ashworth Sentencing and Criminal Justice (3rd ed Butterworths 2000) at 
278.  See also Whittaker and Moxon Enforcing Financial Penalties (British 
HORS 165 1996) at XI and 38-39. 
120  [1994] ELR 153, 159. 
121  [1988] IR 51.  
122  [1989] IR 149. 
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jurisprudence to a level whereby nearly all tribunals or public bodies 
could be asked to provide at least some kind of explanation for their 
decisions, at any rate where judicial review proceedings were in 
prospect.123  Rather surprisingly, however, in the light of this strong 
tide running prior to the recent decision in O’Mahony124 discussed 
below, the issue concerning the obligation on a court to give reasons 
for its judgment had not been the subject of detailed judicial 
comment.125 
 
3.07 The next stage of development was statutory.  The Freedom of 
Information Act 1997 imposed an extensive duty on “public 
bodies”126 to give reasons in making certain sorts of decisions.127  
While this expression naturally does not include the courts, one might 
reasonably ask whether the requirement to give reasons should not 
apply a fortiori where the decisions being taken affect the liberty of 
the citizen.  
 
3.08 To go back to the principles of constitutional justice charted in 
paragraph 3.06 and the right to reasons as deduced therefrom, the law 
in this area has been considerably developed by the recent decision of 
the Supreme Court in the case of O’Mahony v Judge Thomas Ballagh 
and the DPP.128  In O’Mahony the applicant had been convicted of 
drunken driving.  He sought judicial review of the decision of the 
District Court judge on the basis that his trial in the District Court was 
not conducted in accordance with the principles of constitutional 
                                                 
123  See further Byrne and Binchy Annual Review of Irish Law 1988 (Dublin 
Round Hall Press 1989) at 17-18. 
124  Supreme Court 13 December 2001 (Irish Examiner Law Report 28 January 
2002). 
125  It should be noted that the fact that such an obligation existed was recognised 
by the Supreme Court in Creedon v Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Tribunal [1988] IR 51: “I am satisfied that the requirement which applies to 
this Tribunal, as it would to a court, that justice should appear to be done, 
necessitates that the unsuccessful applicant before it should be made aware 
in general and broad terms of the grounds on which he or she has failed.”   
126  For a list of bodies which are included under the Freedom of Information Act 
1997, see the First Schedule to the Act. 
127  See Hogan and Morgan Administrative Law in Ireland (3rd ed. Sweet & 
Maxwell 1998) at 574-577. 
128  Supreme Court 13 December 2001 (Irish Examiner Law Report 28 January 
2002). 
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justice in that the trial judge had failed to address a submission made 
by counsel on behalf of the applicant.  Counsel for the applicant had 
applied to the court for a non-suit at the close of the prosecution case.  
On appeal to the Supreme Court Murphy J held that: 
 
“I would be very far from suggesting that Judges of the 
District Court should compose extensive judgments to meet 
some academic standard of excellence.  In practice, it would 
be undesirable - and perhaps impossible - to reserve decisions 
even for a brief period.  On the other hand it does seem, and in 
my view this case illustrates, that every trial judge hearing a 
case at first instance must give a ruling in such a fashion as to 
indicate which of the arguments he is accepting and which he 
is rejecting and, as far as is practicable in the time available, 
his reasons for so doing.  As I have already said, there is no 
suggestion that Judge Ballagh conducted the case otherwise 
than with dignity and propriety.  It does seem to me however, 
that in failing to rule on the arguments made in support of the 
application for a non suit he fell ‘into an unconstitutionality’ 
to use the words of Henchy J in the State (Holland) v Kennedy 
[1977] IR 183 p.201.”129 
 
3.09 Although Murphy J showed a keen awareness of the demands 
placed on a District Court judge’s time, he also thought it essential 
that reasons for their decisions should be stated in open court.  
Moreover, he placed a special emphasis on the judge’s obligation to 
respond to submissions made by counsel and give reasons for this 
response.  It is clear that submissions made by counsel concerning the 
appropriateness of non-custodial alternatives would fall squarely 
within the scope of this proposition.  From this position it is only a 
few steps further to impose a requirement that, first, the reasons for a 
judge’s decision to impose a custodial sentence are recorded and 
secondly, that reasons are required even where there has been no such 
submission.  
 
3.10 The O’Mahony case finds a resonance in the jurisprudence of 
Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms which provides for the right to a fair trial.130  
                                                 
129  Supreme Court 13 December 2001 (Irish Examiner Law Report 28 January 
2002). Emphasis added. 
130  Article 6(1) states: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or 
of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public 
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It is a requirement of a fair trial in both civil and criminal matters that 
a court should give reasons for its judgment.  As stated by the 
European Court of Human Rights in Van De Hurk v The 
Netherlands:131  “Article 6(1) obliges courts to give reasons for their 
decisions but cannot be understood as requiring a detailed answer for 
every argument. Nor is the European Court called upon to examine 
whether arguments are adequately met.”132 Therefore while Article 
6(1) does not require a full response to all arguments before the court, 
as noted by the European Court in Hiro Balani v Spain133 it does 
oblige the court to provide a “specific and express” answer where the 
submission, if successful, would be decisive to the outcome of the 
case.  It is also important to note that the extent of the requirement 
may vary according to the nature of the decision and the 
circumstances of the case.134 While this requirement does not apply to 
jury trials it does apply to summary trials.  The primary reason given 
by the European Court for the obligation to give reasoned decisions is 
so that the “accused may usefully exercise the right of appeal 
available to him”,135 although further justifications for this right lie in 
the fact that both the defendant and the wider public have a legitimate 
interest in knowing the grounds for any judgment. 
 
3.11 In the light of this jurisprudence it is likely that the 
incorporation of the European Convention into our domestic law will 
strengthen the requirement to give reasons.136  Certainly since the 
enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 in England and Wales, 
closer attention has been paid by the legal community in our 
neighbouring jurisdiction to the need to give reasons.  In Stefan v 
General Medical Council137 for example, the Privy Council made 
reference to the “possible reappraisal of the whole position [in 
                                                                                                                  
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law.” 
131  (1994) 18 EHRR 481. 
132  Ibid at paragraph 61. 
133  (1994) 19 EHRR 566. 
134  Ibid; Ruiz Torifa v Spain (1995) 19 EHRR 553; Georgiadis v Greece (1997) 
24 EHRR 606. 
135  Hadjianastassiou v Greece (1992) 16 EHRR 219. 
136  At the time of writing the European Convention on Human Rights Bill 2001 
had reached the second stage of its passage through the Oireachtas. 
137  [1999] 1 WLR 1293. 
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relation to the duty to give reasons] which the passing of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 may bring about.”  Significantly, Baker has also 
noted that “the [pre-1998] failure of many magistrates to give reasons 
for verdicts or submissions of no case to answer is questionable”.138  
Indeed in the run-up to the 1998 Act, magistrates were hastily trained 
to give reasons.  The requirement now forms part of the latest 
Magistrates’ Court Sentencing Guidelines which state unequivocally 
that “magistrates should normally give reasons for their findings and 
decision; this is obligatory under the Human Rights Act.”139  A pro-
forma document for stating the reasons for sentence is also included 
in the Sentencing Guidelines, a copy of which is provided in 
Appendix 3.  On this document, magistrates are invited to note details 
such as the offence committed, its aggravating and mitigating features 
and the offender’s previous record.     
 
3.12 Most significantly of all, magistrates in England and Wales 
who impose a custodial sentence are required by law, by virtue of s.1 
of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (now consolidated in s.79 of the 
Powers of Criminal Courts Sentencing Act 2000), to identify in open 
court the criterion on which a custodial sentence is based.  There are 
three possible criteria.  First, that the offence was so serious that only 
a custodial sentence can be justified; secondly, that the offence was a 
“violent or sexual offence” and that only such a sentence would be 
adequate to protect the public from serious harm; and thirdly, that the 
offender has failed to express his willingness to comply with a 
probation/ supervision/ drug treatment order.  If the court bases its 
decision on either the first or second criterion then it must go further 
and state why it is of this opinion.140  The decision and the reasons 
underpinning it must be explained to the offender in open court and in 
ordinary language141 and these reasons must then be recorded in both 
the warrant of commitment and in the court register.142  The overall 
effect of these provisions is that they act as a significant restriction on 
the judicial discretion to impose custodial sentences.  While the 
                                                 
138  Baker Human Rights Act 1998: A Practitioner’s Guide (London Sweet & 
Maxwell 1998) at paragraph 4-70. 
139  The Magistrates’ Association Magistrates’ Court Sentencing Guidelines 
(The Magistrates’ Association 2000) at 68. 
140  Section 79(4)(a) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. 
141  Section 79(4)(b) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. 
142  Section 79(5) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. 
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proposal under consideration here is not as exacting in its 
requirements, the English provisions are instructive in that they are 
clearly informed by a desire to ensure that decisions to impose a 
custodial sentence are seen to be carefully taken because reasons are 
given and doubly recorded.  
  
 
C. How Extensive Must the Reasons Be? 
 
3.13 The next issue concerns how extensive the reasons provided 
by the court should be.  Perusal of the pre-1997 case-law on the extent 
of the duty to give reasons in an administrative context reveals that 
the requirement may be satisfied so long as the reasons given are 
meaningful.  Thus the grounds upon which a decision is based should 
be given in “general and broad terms”143 and the “broad gist”144 of the 
basis for a decision should be apparent.  On the other hand, Ashworth 
notes that “a kind of moral expostulation about the offence, ‘one of 
the worst of its kind’, ‘a dreadful and brutal attack’”145 will not 
suffice in isolation.  In the Council of Europe’s Recommendation on 
sentencing referred to above, “reason” is given the following 
definition: “[A] motivation which relates the particular sentence to the 
normal range of sentences for the type of crime and to the declared 
rationales for sentencing.”146  
 
3.14 In the Consultation Paper the Commission did not elaborate 
on the exact content of the reasons to be given, recommending that 
wording along the following lines be adopted: “I impose a custodial 
sentence of…for the following reasons:…”147 It noted that the reasons 
do not have to be lengthy nor elaborate.  At the same time such a 
formula may simply generate terse responses such as “seriousness”, 
“persistence”, “last resort” et cetera.  The danger is that the reasons 
                                                 
143  The State (Creedon) v Criminal Injuries Compensation Tribunal [1988] IR 
51. 
144  Faulker v Ministry for Industry and Commerce [1997] ELR 107. 
145  Ashworth Sentencing and Criminal Justice (3rd ed. Butterworths 2000) at 
305. 
146  Council of Europe Consistency in Sentencing, Recommendation No. R (92) 
17 Strasbourg 19 October 1992, Recommendation E.2. 
147  Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper on Penalties for Minor 
Offences (CP 18-2002) at paragraph 6.28. 
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given could become reduced to the level of the formulaic providing 
no real insight.  Bearing this in mind, the Commission recommends 
that brief reasons should be given outlining the aggravating and 
mitigating factors influencing the decision with particular emphasis, 
where appropriate, on why the non-custodial options available to the 
judge are not appropriate.  In listing the factors which in their opinion 
render the offence one in respect of which a prison sentence is the 
most suitable punishment, judges may wish to have regard to the list 
of aggravating and mitigating factors outlined in the Law Reform 
Commission’s Report on Sentencing148 and which are listed in 
Appendix 3.149  
 
3.15 The main objection to an obligation to give reasons concerns 
the fact that it may cast an additional burden on the courts and cause 
delay.  This is not a small point.  Coupled with the present obligation 
imposed on the courts by O’Mahony which is to rule in open court on 
submissions made by counsel and, as far as is practicable, give 
reasons for such rulings.  This will have the result that, in a case 
which may only take half an hour or so, several more minutes will 
have to be devoted to formulating and announcing reasons as to the 
judge’s decisions on for example, submissions made by counsel on 
the strength of the evidence against the accused or on any defence 
raised.  Further, there may be resource implications in terms of the 
additional administrative burden that the recording of these reasons 
may place on the Courts Service.   
 
3.16 However the requirement that decisions are fair and reasoned, 
particularly where an individual’s liberty is at stake, is so 
overwhelming that the Commission considers that this should not be 
sacrificed for the sake of speed or administrative convenience.  
Furthermore, it has been noted in submissions made to the 
Commission on the issue that in practice most District Court judges 
already give reasons for imposing a custodial sentence where those 
reasons are not self-evident.  In some District Court areas at least, 
                                                 
148  Law Reform Commission Report on Sentencing (LRC 53-1996) at 26-27. 
149  O’Malley states in his book on Sentencing Law and Practice (Dublin Round 
Hall Sweet & Maxwell 2000) at 10 “There would be nothing to lose and 
much to gain from enacting a statute setting out the main factors that are 
ethically relevant in the determination of sentences.”  He recognises the list 
of aggravating and mitigating factors in the Commission’s Report on 
Sentencing op cit as being declaratory of the existing law, but also notes that 
it has no legal status. 
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therefore, the Commission’s recommendation would only serve to set 
on a statutory footing what is current good practice. In short as one 
contributor noted at our seminar: “[T]he most primitive 
jurisprudential definition of law is that it must be reasoned and not 
arbitrary…there are practical problems, but even a note of the 
mitigating/aggravating factors is light years ahead of no reasons at 
all.”150  
 
3.17 Accordingly, the Commission adheres to its earlier 
recommendation that a District Court judge should be required to 
give concise, written reasons for any decision to impose a prison 
sentence rather than a non-custodial sentence.  The Commission 
further recommends, as part of this requirement, that District Court 
judges should record the aggravating and mitigating factors which 
influenced the decision, with particular emphasis on why the non-
custodial options available to the judge are not appropriate. 
 
 
D. Where Should the Reasons be Recorded? 
 
3.18 Given this recommendation, a practical issue arises as to 
where the reasons should be recorded.  Although no mention was 
made of this in O’Mahony, there would appear to be two options open 
to the District Court judge.  One suggestion is that the reasons could 
be written where the sentence imposed is written, namely at the foot 
of the charge sheet or summons.  As the charge sheet would then be 
appended to the warrant of commitment, this would serve to record 
the reasons on the warrant.  This option seemed to receive 
considerable support at the seminar with contributors suggesting that 
the reasons could either be recorded on the charge sheet or a separate 
sheet which would then be appended with the charge sheet to the 
warrant.  Another means of recording the reasons would be a 
“custodial sentence” book which would be kept by the clerk in the 
District Court office for future reference.  As mentioned above, in 
England a magistrate is required to record the reasons to impose a 
custodial sentence in two places; on both the warrant of commitment 
and the court register.  It appears to the Commission that the reasons 
should be recorded on the charge sheet and, by extension, on the 
warrant of commitment where most of the main orders made by the 
                                                 
150  Remark by Judge Bryan McMahon at the Law Reform Commission Seminar 
on Minor Offences 1 July 2002. 
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District Court judge are recorded.  This would also enable the District 
Court judge to note the reasons for imposing a custodial sentence 
personally. 
 52
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PART II: MINOR OFFENCES AND FINES 
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CHAPTER 4: HIGHER FINES FOR WELL OFF 
OFFENDERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.01 The following three chapters are concerned with the level of 
fine which may be levied for a minor offence.  As noted in Chapter 1, 
a survey of the constitutional case law defining “minor offence” 
locates the current upper limit for fines for a minor offence (in so far 
as it can be gauged) at around €3,000 (IR£2,363).  The purpose of this 
chapter is to consider whether a court should adjust fines imposed for 
minor offences in accordance with the financial circumstances of an 
offender in order to ensure that the penalties are equally onerous on 
those who commit comparable offences even though their financial 
circumstances may be very different.  First of all, however, a 
preliminary observation should be made regarding the amount of the 
supposed maximum fine itself.  
 
 
A. Reviewing the Upper Limit 
 
4.02 As observed by the Commission in the Consultation Paper, 
three factors argue in favour of the view that what is conventionally 
regarded as the maximum constitutionally permitted fine is too low.151  
First, and most significantly, there has been no authoritative modern 
review of the effect of inflation on the limit for a fine.  The current 
maximum figure of €3,000 (IR£2,363) may therefore not properly 
reflect the changes wrought by inflation.152  The Supreme Court in 
Melling153 held unanimously that for the purposes of any such 
                                                 
151  See Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper on Penalties for Minor 
Offences (LRC CP18-2002) at paragraphs 6.09-6.17. 
152  See further Law Reform Commission Report on the Indexation of Fines 
(LRC 37-1991) and also Law Reform Commission Report on the Indexation 
of Fines: A Review of Developments (LRC 65-2002). 
153  Melling v O Mathghamhna [1962] IR 1. 
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assessment the relevant date of comparison is 1922.154  If one 
considers that the court in Melling also found that a fixed penalty of 
IR£100 (€127) was minor then, taking the inflation rate since 1922 
into account, this would increase the maximum figure forty-fold to 
€5,079 (IR£4,000) (or even more if one were to take the relevant date 
as 1937 given that there was actually deflation during the period 
1922-37).  
 
4.03 Furthermore, in most of the cases on the topic the courts 
appear to have adopted inflation as the appropriate guide.155  Yet, it is 
open to question whether the inflation rate is the appropriate 
“connecting factor” in any assessment of the current value of the 
upper limit.  As highlighted by the Supreme Court in Melling, it is 
important to consider the penalty from the point of view of the 
offender.  In this regard, the increase in the wage rate would provide a 
better indicator than inflation as to the impact which the fine makes 
on the individual.  If the wage-rate figure is adopted then the increase 
is much higher.  For example, from 1953 (the earliest date for which 
information is available) a 66-fold increase occurred in the average 
industrial wage rate as opposed to a increase of 19-fold in the rate of 
inflation.  
 
4.04 Secondly, the criminal jurisdiction of the District Court has 
failed to keep pace with the increases in the Court’s jurisdictional 
limits in civil cases.  The current District Court limit established in  
1991 is €6,349 (IR£5,000).  Section 14 of the Courts and Court 
Officers Act 2002, which has yet to be brought into effect, extends the 
civil jurisdiction of the District Court to €20,000 (IR£15,750). When 
one considers that the District Court civil jurisdictional limit in 1924 
of IR£25 (€32) would now be worth €1,365 (IR£1,075), it is clear that 
these increases have gone far beyond mere inflationary levels.  
 
4.05 The final suggested basis of comparison is a rather different 
one.  If one compares the maximum fine with the maximum prison 
sentence which can be imposed for a minor offence (currently 12 
                                                 
154  It should be noted, however, that in the more recent case of State (Rollinson) 
v Kelly [1984] IR 248 the Supreme Court adopted a different approach in 
comparing the fine at issue in Melling in 1960 to that in Rollinson in 1984. 
155  The only case in which a judge looked at other factors to any degree was in 
State (Rollinson) v Kelly [1984] IR 248.  However, Griffin J only considered 
the effect of such increases since 1960 (the date of  the Melling decision) and 
not since 1922 or 1937. 
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months) there would appear to be an imbalance between the two.156 
This would arguably remain the case even if the reduced maximum of 
six months were adopted as recommended by the Commission in 
Chapter 2 above.  While there is little authority on the point in 
Ireland, the case-law in other common law jurisdictions appears to 
indicate that a custodial sentence is a much more severe punishment 
than a fine.  As noted in the US case of Muniz v Hoffman,157 the US 
Supreme Court was of the opinion that “from the standpoint of 
determining the seriousness of the risk and the extent of the possible 
deprivation faced by a contemnor, imprisonment and fines are 
intrinsically different.”  In that case they held that a six month term of 
imprisonment was sufficient to bring an offence out of the minor 
category but that the imposition of a fine of a US$10,000 on a trade 
union was not.  The Commission believes that the view that there is 
little moral equivalence between the two maxima is one which would 
be shared by both lawyers and citizens alike.  Indeed, in a socio-legal 
survey carried out in the US in 1984 relating to the development of 
severity scales for penalties, a 12 month prison sentence was 
considered to be equivalent to a US$10,000 fine (or €19,579). These 
considerations therefore lead the Commission to question the 
correctness of the prevailing wisdom that a maximum fine of over 
€3,000 (IR£2,363) would be unconstitutional.   
 
 
B. Fining and the Principle of Equality of Impact 
 
(a) The Status Quo 
 
4.06 A question of obvious importance is the extent to which the 
level of fines currently imposed on offenders acts as a sufficient 
deterrent.  A recent examination conducted by the Comptroller and 
Auditor General into the efficiency of the fines system in relation to 
cases within the jurisdiction of the District Court sheds important 
light on some of the issues.  The Report on Value for Money 
Examination: Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform - 
                                                 
156  For instance in a recent District Court prosecution involving accessing child 
pornography on the internet, the offender preferred to pay €40,000 to a 
charity rather than receiving a custodial sentence: see Irish Times 17 January 
2003. 
157  422 US 454. 
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Collection of Fines158 notes that the ultimate objective of the fines 
system is to reduce the level of offences committed by deterring 
undesirable behaviour.  Having examined the available data on legal 
proceedings in Dublin District Court cases in 1998 the Report found 
that fines were imposed in half of the 57,100 summons cases actually 
heard.159  Overall, the average fine imposed by the Dublin District 
Courts was IR£100 (€127), with the average fine imposed obviously 
varying considerably between different types of offences.  Average 
fines imposed in fine cases in Dublin in 1998 were as follows: 
 
• Parking offences - IR£66 (€84) 
• Disc offences - IR£119 (€151) 
• Speeding offences - IR£68 (€86) 
• Other motoring offences - IR£97 (€123) 
• Other criminal offences - IR£167 (€212)160 
 
4.07 These figures raise questions as to the extent to which these 
fines adequately effect the aims of the criminal law, namely, to make 
an impact on offenders.  While a fine of IR£100 (€127) may have 
quite severe financial implications for an unemployed offender, it is 
unlikely to impact significantly on those with much higher incomes.   
 
4.08 This brings us to the law as regards equality of impact in 
fining as it stands at present.  Currently there is some provision for 
means adjustment in the District Court.  Section 43 of the Criminal 
Justice Administration Act 1914 (as reflected in Order 23, rule 4 of 
the District Court Rules 1997161) provides:  
                                                 
158  Comptroller and Auditor General Report on Value for Money Examination: 
Department of Justice Equality and Law Reform- Collection of Fines, Report 
No.37 Dublin Stationery Office 2000. 
159  Ibid at paragraph 3.44.  The figure is much less when considered as a 
proportion of all summonses actually issued.  Fines were imposed on 
defendants in relation to an estimated 20% (125,000) of the summonses 
issued in all District Court areas in 1998.  The disparity in these two figures 
is due to the large number of cases which are not heard (due to, for example, 
the failure to serve summonses and the large number of cases which are 
struck out without being heard or are withdrawn by the prosecution or where 
there is an acquittal). 
160  Comptroller and Auditor General Report on Value for Money Examination: 
Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform - Collection of Fines 
Report No.37 (Dublin Stationery Office 2000) at paragraph 3.45. 
161  SI No 93 of 1997. 
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“[A] court of summary jurisdiction, in fixing the amount of 
any fine to be imposed on an offender, shall take into 
consideration, amongst other things, the means of an offender 
so far as they appear or are known to the court.” 
 
4.09 However, though the wording of the legislation itself is open-
ended, it is likely that this would be interpreted as only requiring a 
reduction in the standard fine in the case of offenders with less than 
average means and not allowing an increase for more affluent 
offenders.  The reason is a long-established common law rule that 
fines should not be increased for the better-off.  English authority for 
this includes R v Messana162 and R v Fairburn.163  While there is no 
Irish authority explicitly adopting this position, it is prudent to assume 
it would be followed here given the long line of authority on the point 
in England.  Thus at present it is likely that adjustments for means 
may only operate in one direction; the amount of a fine can be 
reduced in the light of an offender’s income but the law may be such 
that the amount cannot be adjusted upwards to reflect the plutocratic 
opulence of a rich offender.  
 
 
A Costs / Compensation Order Against the Offender 
 
4.10 It should be noted too that District Court judges retain a 
discretion to impose on offenders the costs of the prosecution and/ or 
witnesses’ expenses. Order 36 rule 1 of the District Court Rules 1997 
provides: 
“Where the Court makes an order in any case of summary 
jurisdiction (including an order to ‘strike out’ for want of 
jurisdiction) it shall have power to order any party to the 
proceedings other than the Director of Public Prosecutions, or 
a member of the Garda Síochána acting in discharge of his or 
her duties as a police officer, to pay to the other party such 
costs and witnesses’ expenses as it shall think fit to award.” 
 
                                                 
162  [1981] 3 Cr App R (S) 88. 
163  [1980] Cr App R (S) 315. 
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4.11 A compensation order can also be made under s.6(12) of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1993 directing an individual who has been dealt 
with under the Probation of Offenders Act 1907 to pay compensation.  
 
4.12 These provisions allow District Court judges, through the 
imposition of costs/compensation in addition to a fine, of taking a step 
which has the effect of increasing the punitive impact on an offender.  
However a query may be raised as to whether these options should be 
used in effect to compensate for the inadequacy of a fine.  To do so 
would be to make use of a power for an improper purpose.  
Furthermore costs are imposed fairly rarely.  As noted by the Report 
on the Collection of Fines, “in Dublin, only direct witness expenses 
are sought by the prosecution e.g. in drink driving cases, the fees for 
doctors who take blood or urine samples are usually sought.  In other 
cases, costs are sought infrequently because direct expenditure rarely 
arises.”164  Indeed this option is availed of little by the prosecution.  
The Report also found that costs were awarded to the prosecution in 
only 2% of cases where fines were imposed in Dublin District Courts 
in 1998.  Therefore, while the provision remains a useful one in 
appropriate circumstances, particularly where the State has incurred 
considerable expenditure in its prosecution of an offender, it is 
unsuited to more generalised usage. 
 
 
(b) The Principle of Equality of Impact  
 
4.13 It is axiomatic that equality is necessary in order to do justice.  
In Ireland this fundamental postulate finds expression in provisions 
such as Article 40.1 of the Constitution which enshrines the principle 
of equality before the law.165  While this principle has not yet been 
invoked in the field of sentencing law in this jurisdiction,166 in 
                                                 
164  Comptroller and Auditor General Report on Value for Money Examination: 
Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform Collection of Fines Report 
No.37 (Dublin Stationery Office 2000) at paragraph 3.47. 
165  Article 40.1 provides: “All citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal 
before the law.  This shall not be held to mean that the State shall not in its 
enactments have due regard to difference of capacity, physical and moral, 
and of social function.” 
166  It should he noted that, in a more general sense, the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the constitutional guarantee to equality has been quite 
restrictive.  See, for example, Lowth v Minister for Social Welfare [1998] 4 
IR 321. 
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England Professor Ashworth has identified the principle of equality 
before the law and the cognate principle of equal impact as having 
contemporary relevance for the English sentencing system.167  The 
principle of equal impact can be broadly described as the principle 
that penalties “should be so calculated as to impose an equal impact 
on the offenders subjected to them.”168  In its application to fines the 
principle requires that fines should be adjusted to reflect the means of 
offenders to ensure that fines will be “felt” by offenders whatever 
their wealth.  This commonsensical principle requires that fines be 
increased for those who are better-off as well as reduced for those of 
more limited means.  Further it is in keeping with the line of policy  
contained in the saver to Article 40.1, namely, that the principle of 
equality before the law “shall not be held to mean that [laws] shall not 
have due regard to differences of capacity”.  As Kelly169 notes “it 
corresponds with the idea, visible in continental equality 
jurisprudence, that common sense or the realities of society may 
justify or even positively require a certain form of legislative 
differentiation.”    
 
 
(i)  Unit Fines 
 
4.14 One way of giving effect to the principle of equality of impact 
is by means of a system of “unit” or “day” fines.  This system was 
introduced into magistrates’ courts in England by virtue of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1991.170  It operates by assessing the seriousness 
of the offence and assigning a number of units on a scale from 1 to 50 
to reflect this.  The offender’s disposable weekly income is then 
calculated and the fine is determined by multiplying the two figures.  
 
4.15 In its recent Report on the Indexation of Fines: A Review of 
Developments171 the Commission conducted an extensive survey of 
                                                 
167  Ashworth Sentencing & Criminal Justice (3rd ed. Butterworths 2000) at 78-
84.   
168  Ashworth Sentencing and  Criminal Justice (3rd ed. Butterworths 2000) at 
82.  
169  Kelly, Hogan and Whyte The Irish Constitution (Butterworths 1994). 
170  The 1991 Act came into effect on 1 October 1992. 
171  Law Reform Commission Report on the Indexation of Fines: A Review of 
Developments (LRC 65-2002). The Report focused in particular on the 
conclusions drawn by the New Zealand Ministry of Justice Criminal Justice 
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developments in respect of the unit fines system in a number of 
countries such as Australia and New Zealand.  It observed that unit 
fines had proved unworkable in other jurisdictions due to a number of 
factors such as the restrictions they place on the discretion of the 
sentencing court, the complexity of the system (involving as it does a 
two-step process of assessing the severity of the offence and then the 
offender’s means) and the difficulties in obtaining accurate 
information on an offender’s means.  It concluded thus: 
 
“[T]he desirability of unit fine schemes has been considered 
subsequently in a number of jurisdictions and the arguments 
against the adoption of such schemes would appear to have 
prevailed…the Commission believes it would be inappropriate 
to adopt such a system at the present time.”172 
 
 
(ii) Current English Provisions  
 
4.16 In any event, the failure of the unit fines experiment in 
England did not lead the British legislature to abandon the principle 
of equal impact altogether.  Instead, a counter-reform was introduced 
in the form of a statutory provision which leaves magistrates with 
considerably more discretion when determining the amount of a fine. 
Section 65 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (as amended)173 
substituted a new s.18 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991174 providing 
that a court is required to enquire into an offender’s financial 
circumstances before fixing the amount of a fine.  In fixing the 
amount of the fine, magistrates are still required to ensure that it 
reflects inter alia the offender’s financial circumstances.  A similar 
provision has also been introduced recently in New Zealand by virtue 
of s.40 of the Sentencing Act 2002.  This provides that, in determining 
the amount of a fine, a court must take into account inter alia the 
                                                                                                                  
Policy Group Review of Monetary Penalties in New Zealand (June 2000) at 
Chapter 5 and the New South Wales Law Reform Commission Report on 
Sentencing (NSWLRC 79-1996) at Chapter 3. 
172  Law Reform Commission Report on the Indexation of Fines: A Review of 
Developments (LRC 65-2002) at 55. 
173  Section 65 was amended by s.168 Schedule 9 paragraph 42 of the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994. 
174  This section is now consolidated as s.128 of the Powers of Criminal Courts 
(Sentencing) Act 2000. 
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financial capacity of an offender, whether this has the effect of 
reducing or increasing the amount of a fine.  
 
4.17 To turn once again to the English provisions, it is instructive 
to examine in more detail the local arrangements put in place by 
magistrates’ courts since 1993.  Ashworth175 notes that the obvious 
danger was that magistrates would return to the pre-1991 approach 
with all its concomitant inconsistencies.  Studies conducted 
subsequent to the enactment of the 1993 Act appear to have borne out 
the author’s fears.  Home Office studies undertaken by Charman et 
al176 in 1996 and Flood-Page and Mackie177 in 1998 revealed 
considerable divergence in the approach taken by magistrates.  The 
1998 study, for example, sought to examine the circumstances in 
which fines were used and how they were set in relation to income; to 
this end, interviews were undertaken in 12 courts.  The researchers 
found that the magistrates’ courts were divided in their approach to 
fixing the amount of a fine.  Four of the 12 courts had broadly 
adopted the fines recommended in the Magistrates’ Association’s 
1993 Guidelines which were similar to the pre-1991 regime.  Four of 
the courts had altered indicators of seriousness for different offences 
to take account of local factors.  The remaining four courts had 
retained some type of informal unit fines system.  Flood-Page and 
Mackie also solicited magistrates’ views on fining both low-income 
and wealthy offenders.  These interviews revealed considerable 
divergences of opinion, leading the researchers to conclude that 
“these contrasting opinions meant that wealthy offenders could 
receive very different fines at different courts as the size of the fine 
imposed depends largely upon the views of the magistrates at that 
court.”178 
 
4.18 While these studies were conducted on quite a small scale and 
therefore must be treated as suggestive rather than conclusive of court 
                                                 
175  Ashworth Sentencing and Criminal Justice (3rd ed. Butterworths 2000) at 
275. 
176  Charman, Gibson, Honess, and Morgan Fine Impositions and Enforcement 
Following the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (British Research Findings No. 36 
1996). 
177  Flood-Page and Mackie Sentencing Practice: An examination of decisions in 
Magistrates’ Courts and the Crown Court in the mid-1990’s (British 
Research study No. 180 1998). 
178  Ibid at 53. 
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practices, nevertheless, as Ashworth points out, the results “do little to 
allay fears that disparities in fining occur to a considerable degree.”179  
Indeed concerns about disparities in the fines imposed by magistrates 
in different geographical areas180 have led the Magistrates’ 
Association in the most recent version of their Sentencing Guidelines 
(2000) to take a more structured approach with fines being set 
according to three broad income bands.  Ashworth heralds this 
development as “an attempt to combine structure with flexibility”.181  
 
4.19 The fining system under the guidelines can be summarised 
briefly thus.  A magistrate, having assessed the seriousness of the 
offence, will categorise it at level A, B or C.  These groups mean that 
the fine should be equated with: half a week’s net income; one week’s 
net income; and one and a half weeks’ net income respectively.  The 
suggested fines have been calculated to take account of ordinary 
living expenses so, when determining the amount of a fine, 
magistrates need to look only at net income.  Net income means 
“take-home pay” or, in the case of someone on benefits, “cash in 
hand.”  In the absence of adequate information on means, magistrates 
will then proceed to make an assessment of the offender’s income 
drawing such inferences as to means as they think just in the 
circumstances.  The guideline fines suggested by the Magistrates’ 
Association Sentencing Guidelines are given in Appendix 4.  
 
4.20 To conclude, therefore, it would appear that the magistrates’ 
courts in England have come full circle.  Having abandoned a system 
of unit fines and adopted a looser formulation in 1993, means-tested 
fines are once again being introduced as non-statutory guidelines.  In 
the light of these developments it is tempting to conclude that the unit 
fines system merits re-examination.  However, in the light of the 
difficulties experienced in England and other jurisdictions with the 
unit fines system, most notably with its rigid and complex formula as 
mentioned at paragraph 4.15, the Commission considers it imprudent 
to recommend a similar system here.  
 
                                                 
179  Ashworth Sentencing and Criminal Justice (3rd ed. Butterworths 2000) at 
275. 
180  See Editorial “Fines-consistency or controversy?” (2000) 150 New Law 
Journal 449. 
181  Ashworth op cit (3rd ed. Butterworths 2000) at 276. 
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4.21 For reasons given at paragraphs 4.07 and 4.13, the 
Commission favours giving effect to the principle of equality of 
impact by other means.  Legislation along the following lines seems to 
offer a workable and straightforward model:    
 
“(1)  Before fixing the amount of any fine to be imposed on 
an offender, a District Court shall inquire into the financial 
circumstances of the offender. 
 
(2)  The amount of any fine fixed by a District Court shall 
be such as, in the opinion of the Court, reflects the seriousness 
of the offence.   
 
(3)  In fixing the amount of any fine to be imposed on an 
offender (whether an individual or other person,) a District 
Court shall take into account the circumstances of the case 
including, among other things, the financial circumstances of 
the offender so far as they are known or appear to the Court.  
 
(4)  Subsection (3) above applies whether taking into 
account the financial circumstances of the offender has the 
effect of increasing or reducing the amount of the fine.”182 
 
4.22 As noted in subsection (3), these provisions should be without 
prejudice to the general discretion of the sentencing judge to impose a 
penalty that is appropriate and just having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case.  The Commission also reiterates its view 
(also expressed in the updated Report on the Indexation of Fines183) 
that the imposition of different fines in respect of similar offences in 
circumstances where the means of the offenders differs is not 
productive of inequality but rather a result that furthers the underlying 
principle of equality of impact.  
                                                 
182  This legislation is modelled upon s.65 of the English Criminal Justice Act 
1993 as amended by s.168 Schedule 9 paragraph 42 of the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994 now consolidated as s.128 of the Powers of 
Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.   
183  Law Reform Commission Report on Indexation of Fines: A Review of 
Developments (LRC 65-2002) at paragraph 3.08. 
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CHAPTER 5: ASCERTAINING THE MEANS OF AN 
OFFENDER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.01 In the light of the recommendation in the previous chapter, it 
is important to give consideration to the ways in which the court can 
obtain an accurate and timely indication of an offender’s means.  As 
noted above, this significant difficulty contributed to the demise of 
the unit fine system not only in England but also in other countries 
such as Mexico, Western Australia and the Commonwealth of 
Australia.184  In the Consultation Paper the Commission recognised 
that this posed a difficulty, although one which was not 
insurmountable.  In its provisional recommendation the Commission 
concluded thus: 
“[U]ndoubtedly, the difficulty of obtaining an accurate 
assessment of the accused’s means is substantial.  The 
proposal that the Commission is making - to match the fine to 
the offender’s means - will operate more or less imperfectly, 
to the extent that courts do not have a complete picture of the 
accused’s means.”185  
5.02  In seeking to resolve this difficult problem, additional 
impetus is added by the sentiments expressed by judges at the seminar 
to the effect that the current methods by which means are established 
in the courts are inadequate.  Both District Court and Circuit Court 
judges were keen to emphasise that ascertaining an individual’s 
means was an exercise fraught with difficulty and one in which they 
had hitherto relied heavily on their own common sense and 
experience.  Moreover, since the recommendation applies to both 
natural and legal persons, it is necessary to consider how means 
                                                 
184  See Law Reform Commission Report on Indexation of Fines (LRC 37-1991) 
at 58-62. 
185  Ibid at paragraph 7.21. 
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assessments may be best carried out both in respect of individuals and 
companies.  
 
 
A. ASCERTAINING THE FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
OF INDIVIDUALS 
 
(a)  English Methods of Ascertaining Means 
 
5.03 As the legislation proposed is modelled on that already in 
place in England, the methods by which magistrates’ courts in our 
neighbouring jurisdiction ascertain the means of an offender provide 
an obvious starting point.  Although as noted above a court is obliged 
to consider an individual’s financial circumstances, it is the offender’s 
duty to disclose their financial circumstances.  It is clear from the 
debates at the time that the British government did not intend that 
there should be a prescribed statutory form for inquiring into an 
individual’s financial circumstances.186  Nevertheless, since 1993 
means enquiry forms have been used by various magistrates’ courts to 
assist in determining means.187   
 
5.04 While the forms vary in the amount of detail required, they all 
seek basic information on income and expenditure and most request 
documentary evidence such as pay slips to support the information 
provided in the form.  Although operating on a non-statutory basis, 
the use of means forms appears to be fairly widespread in England 
and Wales.  In this regard it is interesting to note that 11 of the 12 
courts studied by Flood-Page and Mackie188 followed the 
recommendations of the Best Practice Guidance issued by the Lord 
Chancellor’s Department (1990) to obtain information about 
offenders’ income for all fine cases.  The other court studied by the 
researchers relied on questions in court.  In this study, at least, the 
                                                 
186  Parliament had actually considered whether the legal aid form would be 
sufficient but this idea was rejected on the basis that a change in the law 
would be required to remove the need for the offender to give his consent to 
the form being used for this purpose and that such a change could act as a 
disincentive to defendants applying for legal aid.  
187  Sally Dickinson, Chief Executive, Magistrates’ Association kindly gave us 
assistance in providing us with sample forms. 
188  Flood-Page and Mackie Sentencing Practice: An examination of decisions in 
Magistrates’ Courts and the Crown Court in the mid-1990’s (British 
Research study No. 180 London 1998). 
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form was by far the preferred method of ascertaining means.  
Currently means enquiry forms vary from court to court in the level of 
detail they require, although the Magistrates’ Association are in the 
process of developing a standard means form which should be 
available to magistrates in the near future.189 
 
5.05 The 1993 Act, however, does provide the court with two 
options where an offender has failed to furnish the court with 
information as to means.  First, where it has not been provided with 
adequate information, s.126 of the 2000 Act empowers a court to 
make a financial circumstances order against an individual.190  
Section 126(3) defines the order thus: 
 
“In this section a ‘financial circumstances order’ means, in 
relation to any individual, an order requiring him to give to the 
court, within such period as may be specified in the order, 
such a statement of his financial circumstances as the court 
may require.” 
 
5.06 As the section makes clear, it is for the court to determine how 
much information it requires as to means.  In practical terms this 
affords  the court the option of compelling the offender to complete a 
means form in advance of sentence.  It is an offence for an offender 
who fails to comply with the order without reasonable excuse to 
knowingly or recklessly make a statement which he or she knows to 
be false, or to knowingly fail to disclose any information.191  
However, the Commission notes the view expressed by the 
Magistrates’ Association in England that this provision is rarely 
used.192   
 
                                                 
189  At the time of writing, the standardised form had been formulated and had 
been sent to Lord Chancellor’s office for approval.  
190  Schedule 3 paragraph 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993.  It should be noted 
that the terminology changed from a “statement of means” (s. 20 of the 1991 
Act) to a “statement of financial circumstances”.  This change is probably 
not significant.  See Fortson “Criminal Justice Act, 1993” in Current Law 
Statutes Annotated 1993 Volume 3 (London Sweet and Maxwell 1994) at 
36-119. 
191  Subsections 126(4) -126(5).  
192  Sally Dickinson, Chief Executive & Association Secretary, Magistrates’ 
Association. 
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5.07 The alternative course of action is for the court to proceed by 
virtue of s.128(5) to make such determination in relation to the 
offender’s financial circumstances as it thinks fit.  This may be done 
straight away where an offender has failed to co-operate with the 
court in providing information as to means or subsequently where he 
has failed to comply with a financial circumstances order.  Fortson193 
has noted that, in this event, “the court may simply try to make a 
realistic determination from the limited information available to it or 
(and there seems nothing wrong in principle with this approach) it 
may assume that an offender is well able to pay any fine that the court 
may impose unless and until the offender establishes the contrary.”  
At the same time, the Magistrates’ Association’s Sentencing 
Guidelines194 indicate that it is inappropriate simply to fine the 
offender the maximum amount.  Instead, magistrates are advised to 
draw such inference as to means as they think just in the 
circumstances. 
 
5.08 The fact that a magistrates’ court in England may request 
individuals to produce their pay slips or social welfare receipts as a 
means of verifying evidence stated in the means enquiry forms is an 
interesting feature which merits development.  Ideally, there should 
be compulsory disclosure of income through tax returns or social 
welfare documents.  The objection will be raised however that these 
are highly confidential documents.  It is possible that a similar 
objection may be made in respect of unofficial documents such as pay 
slips.  Nevertheless, this system has worked effectively in England 
since 1991 without particular public outrage.  This has been so despite 
the fact that, in failing to comply fully with this order, an individual 
commits a summary offence.  In the final analysis, courts are entitled 
to the evidence which they need irrespective of embarrassment.  
Should a defendant object to details of their financial position being 
aired in open court, there would appear to be little difficulty with the 
court viewing the document in confidence.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
193  Fortson “Criminal Justice Act 1993” in Current Law Statutes Annotated 
1993 (London Sweet & Maxwell 1994) at 36-120. 
194  The Magistrates’ Association Magistrates’ Court Sentencing Guidelines 
(The Magistrates’ Association 2000) at 70. 
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(b)  Means Assessment in Ireland 
 
5.09 There is a dearth of research in Ireland on fines imposed by 
the courts generally and the same problem pertains to the subject 
under discussion namely, the extent of the enquiry made by District 
Court judges into an offender’s financial circumstances when 
determining the amount of a fine.  This Report has already observed 
that there is currently a statutory requirement on the District Court to 
take into consideration the means of the offender in fixing the amount 
of any fine to be imposed, although this serves in practice only to 
reduce it.195  These enquiries are usually conducted verbally in open 
court.  The limited research that has been conducted however, has 
tended to focus on imprisonment for debt collection or where fines 
were too high or inappropriate given the offender’s poverty (which 
would suggest that the enquiry as it stands may not elicit the true 
position).  The Commission is concerned here with both this problem 
and with the situation in which the fine is too low given the offender’s 
means.  
 
5.10 The Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and 
Women’s Rights in its recent (2000) Report on Alternatives to Fines 
and Uses of Prison196 recommended a full means enquiry in every 
case where a financial penalty is being considered in order “[t]o 
ensure that fines are explicitly tailored to the defendant’s ability to 
pay”.197  O’Donnell198 in Crime and Poverty in Ireland also makes an 
argument for reform.  While acknowledging that the current law 
states that judges must take into account the defendant’s means when 
setting the level of the fine, he argues that, given the high level of 
imprisonment in default of payment of fines (35% in 1993), the 
system is not working effectively. 
 
                                                 
195  Section 43 of the Criminal Justice Administration Act 1914 as reflected in 
Order 23 of the  District Court Rules (SI 93 of 1997). 
196  See Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women’s Rights 
Report of the Sub-Committee on Crime and Punishment of the Joint 
Committee on Justice Equality, Defence and Women’s Rights on Alternatives 
to Fines and the Uses of Prison (Stationery Office February 2000) at 
paragraph 16. 
197  Ibid. 
198  See O’Donnell “Crime, Punishment and Poverty” in Bacik and O’Connell 
(eds.) Crime and Poverty in Ireland (Round Hall Sweet and Maxwell 1998) 
at 40-41. 
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5.11 More recently the Report on Imprisonment for Fine Default 
and Civil Debt,199 commissioned by the Department of Justice, aimed 
to gather qualitative information in relation to those persons who find 
themselves committed to prison for non-payment of fines and civil 
debt.  In the course of their research, the authors conducted 24 
interviews with persons in prison for non-payment of fines or civil 
debt.  Although the views of fine defaulters towards the court process 
are obviously highly subjective, nevertheless, the issues raised by the 
interviews are of considerable interest.  First, in relation to the court 
process, the report notes that “not all interviewees were in court, and 
even where interviewees had been, their understanding of the setting 
and process is often very limited.”200  Secondly, and even more 
worryingly, the Report concluded that “enquiries in the court process 
about offenders means and capacity to pay fines would appear to be 
non-existent or at best cursory.”201  Moreover, the Report’s 
conclusions find a resonance in research conducted into imprisonment 
for civil debt.202  
                                                 
199  Nexus Research Co-operative Final Report to Department of Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform on Imprisonment for Fine Default and Civil Debt 
(Dublin Stationery Office 2002). 
200  Ibid at 40.  
201  Ibid at 48. 
202  Connolly examined statistics on imprisonment for civil debt for 1993 and 
concluded that very few debtors used the limited facilities available to them, 
many failed to appear in court and few applied for or were granted legal aid.  
See Connolly “The legal System in Ireland: Its Impact on those in Debt” in 
Cousins (ed.) Debt and Money Advice: A Partnership Approach-Report of 
the National Money Advice Conference Department of Social Welfare 
(2000).  In a similar vein, a recent submission on behalf of the Money 
Advice and Budgeting Service (“MABS”) for the West and North West 
Region in 1999 analysed 33 debt cases and noted that only two debtors had 
submitted a statement of means and only four had appeared in court 
(including the two who had submitted the statement of means).  The MABS 
argued that debtors were not participating in the court process whilst actions 
which may have serious consequences were escalating against them.  They 
recommended that measures be put in place to encourage debtor 
participation.  One of these measures comprised the production of 
“information leaflets and simplified means forms for completion which 
clearly showed income, expenditure, credit and debt commitments” to be 
sent with court documentation to help the debtor understand and take part in 
the proceedings. See Money Advice and Budgeting Service West and North 
West Region Submission to the Department of Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform; Subject: Response to proposed Attachment of Earnings Bill and 
appraisal of the legal system for debt  recovery (Unpublished 1999).  In the 
case of civil debt there is no set form for the debtor to complete although the 
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(i)  Legal Aid 
 
5.12 An analogy can also be drawn with the procedure already in 
place for legal aid (though this machinery is not actually used in a 
typical fine case).  It will be recalled that, in the debate preceding the 
introduction of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 in England, the British 
Parliament gave consideration to the use of the existing legal aid form 
for that purpose.203  Certainly it can be supposed that the aim of 
individuals in both situations may be to present their incomes in as 
modest a light as possible.  The analogy is best drawn with the 
procedure for criminal as opposed to civil legal aid since the 
procedure attending eligibility for the civil legal aid system is 
essentially administrative rather than judicial; it is carried out by civil 
servants rather than members of the judiciary.  Further the civil legal 
aid process is more drawn-out with a facility for the details provided 
to be verified by other Government Departments such as the 
Department of Social Welfare or the Revenue Commissioners.   
 
 
(I) criminal legal aid 
 
5.13 Woods notes in his book204 on District Court criminal 
procedure: 
 
“Before a person is granted a legal aid certificate he may be 
required by the Court to furnish a written statement about 
matters relevant for determining whether his means are 
sufficient to enable him to obtain legal aid. [1962 Act, s.9].  
For this purpose a Statement of Means Form is prescribed 
under r. 9(2), 1965 regs., and copies may be obtained from the 
Court officer.  The penalty on summary conviction for 
knowingly making false or misleading statements (either 
verbally or in writing) for the purpose of obtaining legal aid is 
                                                                                                                  
introduction of a comprehensive means form is advocated by both Connolly 
and the MABS. 
203  However, they ultimately dismissed this idea on the grounds that a change in 
the law would be required to remove the need for the offender to give his 
consent to the form being used for this purpose and that such a change could 
act as a disincentive to defendants to apply for legal aid. 
204  Woods District Court Practice and Procedure in Criminal Cases (1994). 
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a fine not exceeding £100 or six months imprisonment, or 
both, and the Court may further order a person to repay any 
sum already paid under the scheme in respect of that 
certificate  [1962 Act, s.11].”205 
 
5.14 The statement of means form referred to is brief and inquires 
into matters such as number of dependants, average weekly income, 
rent/ mortgage payments and assets that could be used to obtain legal 
aid.  The form prescribed in the 1965 regulations is given in 
Appendix 6.  It is noteworthy that it is a summary offence to provide 
false or misleading information on the means form.  
 
 
(II) civil legal aid 
 
5.15 A legal aid certificate is a requirement to obtain legal aid and 
will be granted on the condition that an applicant meets the financial 
eligibility requirements.206  Civil legal aid in Ireland is subject to a 
more rigorous means test than criminal legal aid.  Applicants must 
complete a statement of income and a statement of capital for civil 
legal aid.  Details must be furnished with regard to an applicant’s 
disposable income (that is, income after certain deductions in respect 
of dependants, rent or mortgage payments, et cetera have been made) 
and also their disposable capital (that is, the value of an individual’s 
capital resources after certain deductions in respect of any charge, 
mortgage, loan or debt et cetera).  Copies of these statements are 
provided in Appendix 7.  Income as declared is expected to be 
                                                 
205  Woods op cit at 555-556. Section 9(1) of the Criminal Justice (Legal Aid) 
Act 1962 provides:  
 “Before a person is granted a legal aid certificate he may be 
required by the court or judge, as the case may be, granting the 
certificate to furnish a written statement in such form as may be 
prescribed by the Minister by regulations under s.10 of his Act 
about matters relevant for determining whether his means are 
insufficient to enable him to obtain legal aid.” 
 Rule 9(2) of the Criminal Justice (Legal Aid) Regulations 1965 provides: 
 “Where a person is required, pursuant to s.9 of the Act, to furnish 
a statement relevant for determining whether his means are 
insufficient to enable him to obtain legal aid, the statement shall 
be in the form set out in the Second Schedule to these 
Regulations.” 
206  Section 28 of the Civil Legal Aid Act 1995. 
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supported by documentary evidence such as a pay slip or social 
welfare book.  Applicants are warned that the Department of Social 
Welfare or another Government body such as the Revenue 
Commissioners may be asked to investigate their means.  
 
 
(c) Should a Means Form be Adopted? 
 
5.16 The available data on means assessment by the courts in 
England and Ireland serves to highlight a number of issues.  The first 
question to be answered in the light of this research is therefore: 
should a compulsory statutory means form be adopted?  As discussed 
above, a statutory form was not centrally adopted in England in 1993 
yet courts and magistrates’ associations have thought it worth 
developing their own form locally.  It is also pertinent to note that the 
limited research that has been conducted in Ireland into fines, 
although focusing primarily on imprisonment for debt collection or in 
default of payment of fines, tends to suggest that the means enquiry 
which currently operates in fixing the amount of a fine is far from 
satisfactory and has led to calls for a fuller, more systematic means 
enquiry in every case.  A means form may go some way towards 
meeting this objective.  A further argument in favour of a form relates 
to the adequacy of the current oral enquiry.  Judges at the seminar 
readily conceded that present assessments as to means in court are a 
very imprecise science.  This would suggest that there is room for 
improvement in this area.  
 
5.17 On the other hand it should remembered that District Court 
judges may hear 250 to 300 traffic cases in a morning.  The 
compulsory use of a form, the discussion of its contents and the 
enforcement of this requirement, may prove a time consuming 
process given that a fine is frequently imposed for this type of 
summary offence.207  It will be recalled that the recent Report on the 
Collection of Fines for example found that in Dublin District Court 
cases in 1998 fines were imposed in half of the 57,100 summons 
cases actually heard.  An obligation to conduct a detailed enquiry as 
to assets and income may significantly add to the workload of the 
District Courts.  In this regard, it should also be borne in mind that the 
                                                 
207  Comptroller and Auditor General Report on Value for Money Examination: 
Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform- Collection of Fines Report 
No.37 (Dublin Stationery Office 2000) at paragraph 3.44.  
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Commission seeks to discourage the use of custodial sentences where 
possible.  The inconvenience associated with the imposition of a fine 
could very well discourage the use of one of the main alternatives to a 
custodial sentence in Ireland. 
 
5.18  Another issue arising from the research is the fact that a 
significant number of offenders do not participate in the process.  For 
this reason it is important that, in the absence of information as to 
means (whether due to the non-appearance of the offender in court or 
otherwise), the court should be able to proceed to make such 
determinations in relation to an offender’s financial circumstances as 
it thinks fit. 
 
5.19 On balance, therefore, the Commission considers that the 
mandatory use of a statutory form may unduly inhibit a District Court 
judge’s discretion in assessing the means of an offender.  A 
compromise solution, however, may lie in making the use of a means 
form discretionary.  This would allow the Court to come to its own 
conclusions as to whether a form would be of any assistance in 
determining means and avoid unnecessary delay in cases where an 
offender’s means are self-evident.  As outlined by the Minster of State 
in England prior to the introduction of the 1993 legislation, “[this 
would allow the] courts to determine how, and in what depth [the] 
inquiry should be made in each case… [W]e don’t want to fetter the 
discretion of the courts…”208  In the absence of the relevant 
information as to means, the court should be able to proceed to make 
such determination in relation to an offender’s financial 
circumstances as it thinks fit. 
 
 
(d) The Scope of the Inquiry 
 
5.20 Next this section considers the scope of the inquiry into 
financial circumstances.  Should questions be asked on the means 
form as to the capital assets of an offender and should the inquiry 
extend to an offender’s partner or spouse?  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
208  Standing Committee B Col. 244 June 17 1993. 
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(i)  Should Assets be Considered? 
 
5.21 In relation to the first question, it is noteworthy that most of 
the English means enquiry forms focus on an individual’s weekly 
disposable income to the exclusion of capital assets.  However, it 
should be noted that the use of weekly disposable income as the 
relevant criterion in England is a throwback to the unit fines system 
which sought to punish offenders by depriving them of a certain 
number of days’ income.  In contrast, the approach taken in New 
Zealand is that, should a court require the offender to provide a 
declaration of financial capacity, this must contain information on all 
sources of income without restriction namely, assets, liabilities, and 
outgoings including ownership of real estate, vehicle ownership and 
realisable assets.  Indeed one drawback with the English approach is 
that, by restricting a means inquiry solely to an individual’s income, it 
may allow someone who is income-poor but asset-rich to attract only 
a relatively light fine.  It is difficult to see why, in these 
circumstances, the principle of equality of impact should not extend 
to the assets of such individuals when the amount of a fine is being 
assessed. 
 
5.22 For this reason the Commission believes that the Court 
should have regard, where appropriate, to the assets of an offender 
when determining the fine to be imposed and that questions should be 
included on the relevant form as to the assets owned by an individual.  
Thus, not only would the salaries of offenders be taken into account, 
but also their incomes from rental properties, their ownership of land 
or real estate (excluding the family home), income from stocks and 
shares and other securities and debts owed to them. The Commission 
considers however, that it would be improper for consumer goods, 
such as the family car, to be taken into account in any assessment of 
financial circumstances.  The counter-argument to this proposal - that 
it would open up an appalling vista of complication - may be met by 
saying that the form would only be used on fairly rare occasions 
when, for good reasons (whether as to income or capital), the court 
considered that it would serve a useful and just purpose. 
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(ii) Whose Financial Circumstances: Offenders or Their 
Families? 
 
5.23 In relation to the second point, there is case law which 
addresses the issue in England. The English courts have interpreted 
s.65 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993, as amended, to permit 
consideration of the means of only the individual who is before the 
court.  This issue was raised in the case of Colfox v Dorset County 
Council209 which arose by way of a case stated against a fine imposed 
on the appellant.  One of the grounds upon which the appeal was 
taken was that the Crown Court had erred in law in relying upon 
common knowledge in Dorset that the applicant came from a very 
well-known local, land-owning family when imposing the fine.  The 
Appeal Court quashed the decision of the Crown Court and held that 
“in the light of s.18 and the authorities (see R v Charlambous 6 Cr 
App R (S) 389) the ability of the family to pay a fine must be ignored.  
What matters is the ability of the defendant to pay the fine.”210 
 
5.24 The Charlambous case referred to in the judgement merits 
further consideration since it concerns a common situation in which 
the court is required to assess the means of a married woman whose 
personal income is small or non-existent but whose husband has a 
substantial income and who accordingly has a standard of living 
based upon that level of income.  The case concerned a fine of 
Stg£300 imposed on a married woman for petty larceny.  The 
woman’s annual income from a newspaper kiosk, combined with that 
of her husband who owned the kiosk, appeared to be around 
Stg£8,000.  However the appellant’s personal earnings from the kiosk 
were only about Stg£15 per week.  The Court reduced the fine to 
Stg£50, emphasising that a fine must not be so high that a person 
could not afford to pay the fine from his or her own money.  It 
seemed to the Court unjust that a family should be fined.  Although 
the case was decided in 1984 in the context of the (non-statutory) 
requirement that the sentencer in the Crown Court should ensure that 
the offender has the means to pay the fine, it would appear to indicate 
that the sentencer should have regard only to the personal means of 
the offender and disregard any resources to which an individual may 
have effective access, such as those of their spouse.  
                                                 
209  Queen’s Bench Division Hooper J 10 February 1996. 
210  Ibid at 5. 
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5.25 As the Colfox case would appear to suggest, the same 
reasoning would apply to the provisions of s.65.  Although this may 
appear productive of some injustice in the case where a spouse has a 
much more substantial income, traditionally the relevant means to be 
taken into account were always those of the offender.  As one 
commentator noted in relation to the Charlambous case above, 
“[a]lthough the result may seem artificial it would be consistent with 
the principle developed in other kinds of case that a court should not 
impose a fine on an offender without means on the assumption that 
some other person will pay the fine….”211  Opinion at the seminar and 
in written submissions to the Commission followed the view that 
punishment should be strictly personal to the offender and that taking 
into account the means of an offender’s spouse could be productive of 
injustice.  In view of these considerations and also the constitutional 
right to privacy of the spouse (who has not been convicted of any 
offence) the Commission considers it unwise to take into account a 
spouse’s means or, therefore, to extend the means inquiry to the 
spouse or partner of the offender.  In the light of this and other 
conclusions reached in relation to the capital assets of an offender at 
paragraph 5.22 above, the Commission recommends that a precedent 
means form along the lines of the form in Appendix 8 be adopted.  
Such a form may assist the court in endeavouring to ascertain an 
individual offender’s financial circumstances in cases where the court 
deems fit.  
 
 
B. ASCERTAINING THE FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
OF A COMPANY 
 
5.26 As remarked in the Consultation Paper, the problem of 
determining income is less acute in the case of companies as they are 
required to file an “annual return” with the Registrar of Companies.  
The information provided on the annual return, which includes 
specified particulars of the annual accounts of the company such as 
the balance sheet and profit and loss account,212 is, therefore, 
accessible to the public.213  At least in theory, there should be little 
                                                 
211  [1985] Crim L Rev 328. 
212  Sections 7-12 of the Companies (Amendment) Act 1986. 
213  Section 125 of the Companies Act 1963 requires every company having a 
share capital once a year to make a return (termed the “annual return”) to the 
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difficulty for a company to produce these documents for the court 
prior to sentence.  This issue was examined by the English Court of 
Appeal in the case of R v Howe,214 a health and safety case in which 
the Court set out guidelines as to the fines which should be imposed 
on companies for health and safety offences.  It is worth quoting at 
length from the judgment for the judicial exploration of the practical 
difficulties surrounding the production in court of information as to 
the state of a company’s finances.  Scott Baker J stated: 
 
“Any fine should reflect not only the gravity of the offence but 
also the means of the offender, and this applies just as much to 
corporate defendants as to any other (see s.18(3) of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1991).  Difficulty is sometimes found in 
obtaining timely and accurate information about a corporate 
defendant’s means.  The starting point is its annual accounts.  
If a defendant company wishes to make any submission to the 
court about its ability to pay a fine it should supply copies of 
its accounts and any other financial information on which it 
intends to rely in good time before the hearing both to the 
court and to the prosecution.  This will give the prosecution 
the opportunity to assist the court should the court wish it.  
Usually accounts need to be considered with some care to 
avoid reaching a superficial and perhaps erroneous conclusion.  
Where accounts or other financial information are deliberately 
not supplied the court will be entitled to assume that the 
company is in a position to pay any financial penalty it is 
minded to impose.  Where the relevant information is 
provided late it may be desirable for sentence to be adjourned, 
if necessary at the defendant’s expense, so as to avoid the risk 
of the court taking what it is told at face value and imposing 
an inadequate penalty.”215 
 
5.27 The Commission echoes the views expressed by Scott Baker J 
in relation to the difficulties which may obtain in relying on the 
                                                                                                                  
Registrar of Companies.  Failure by the company to comply with these 
requirements renders the company liable to a fine not exceeding IR£500 
(€635).  Where the company fails for two consecutive years to make an 
annual return, the Registrar may take steps to have the company’s name 
struck off the Register of Companies and to have the company dissolved.   
214  [1999] 2 All ER 249. 
215  [1999] 2 All ER 249, 254-5. 
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annual accounts of a company to provide an accurate reflection of its 
financial worth.  Very often the accounts which are appended to the 
annual return may not provide information on the market value, as 
opposed to the book value, of the company’s stock.  It is therefore 
important that judges should be alive to this problem when attempting 
to determine the financial circumstances of a company prior to 
imposing a fine.  As noted in earlier papers, the experience of a good 
judge may stand in good stead for reams of accounts and Nordic 
calculations.216 
                                                 
216  Law Reform Commission Report on the Indexation of Fines (LRC 37-1991) 
at 62. 
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CHAPTER 6: INCREASING THE MAXIMUM FINE 
FOR COMPANIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.01 The penalties which may be imposed specifically on 
corporations for minor infringements of the law formed the subject 
matter of the Commission’s final recommendation in the Consultation 
Paper.217  Penalties specifically suited to the corporate character, such 
as equity fines and corporate probation,218 have recently been 
developed in other jurisdictions.  In Ireland the fine is the only real 
sanction available as companies obviously cannot be incarcerated.219  
Further, since companies use cost-benefit analysis (whether formally 
or informally), it is obviously important to impose fines on companies 
which are significant enough to act as a sufficient deterrent.  Two 
points are relevant here.  First, companies would be subject to the 
general principle considered in paragraph 4.21 above in favour of 
increasing fines for individual wrongdoers based on the principle of 
“equality of impact”.  As noted by the English Court of Appeal in 
Howe,220 the obvious point of departure in assessing the means of a 
company is its annual accounts which companies are required to file 
as part of their “annual return”.  This decision is examined above at 
paragraph 5.26.  Secondly, in the case of many companies, even a 
maximum fine of up to €3,000 would represent only a tiny fraction of 
their annual profit.  Accordingly, this chapter examines a proposal to 
permit an increase in the maximum fine for a company. 
 
                                                 
217  See above at paragraph 3.  
218  See further the Law Reform Commission’s forthcoming Consultation Paper 
on Corporate Homicide and for a useful comparative discussion, Friel, 
“Corporate Criminal Liability: A Comparative Analysis-Part I” (1999) CLP 
191 and “Part II” (1999) CLP 226.  
219  Corporations may, however, be subjected to dissolution or other forms of 
incapacitation, but this has undesirable overspill effects in terms of 
unemployment, et cetera.  
220  R v Howe [1999] 2 All ER 249. 
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A. The Need for  Higher Fines for Companies 
 
 
6.02 In recent times the legislature has criminalised a wide variety 
of activities which apply exclusively or mainly in the corporate 
sector.  As noted by O’Sullivan,221 “the Companies Acts 1963-1990, 
the Pension Act 1990, the Investment Intermediaries Act 1995, the 
Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 1989, the Competition Act 
1991 (as amended by the Competition (Amendment) Act 1996) all 
provide inter alia mechanisms whereby summary charges can be 
brought by a designated authority as part of a process of ensuring that 
the aims of the Act are achieved.”222  It is proposed, therefore, to 
examine the penalties imposed in some of the principal areas where 
companies form the majority of offenders, namely: (a) company law; 
(b) health and safety law; (c) competition law, and; (d) environmental 
law.  
 
 
(a)  Company Law 
 
6.03 Currently most summary offences under the Companies Acts 
1963-2001 are subject to a maximum level of €1,905 (IR£1,500).  
This represents an increase of €635 (IR£500) on the previous maxima 
and is provided for in the Company Law Enforcement Act 2001.223 
Nevertheless, it has been observed by the Company Law Review 
Group in their First Report224 that it has been the practice of the 
courts to impose fines for company law offences in the order of €317 
(IR£250).  As the Group rather temperately pointed out, “this does not 
help the deterrent factor”.225  This led it to recommend that a 
minimum fine of €500 (IR£394) should be set (save with such limited 
statutory exceptions as are necessary to comply with the 
constitutional rights of the defendant).  Friel226 has also been critical 
                                                 
221  O’Sullivan “The Prosecution of Companies for Summary Offences” (2000) 
3(6) Irish Business Law 155. 
222  Ibid.  
223  Section 104(c) of the Company Law Enforcement Act 2001. 
224  Company Law Review Group First Report (Dublin Stationery Office 2001). 
225  Ibid at para 8.5.2. 
226  Friel “Corporate Criminal Liability: A Comparative Analysis - Part I” (1999) 
CLP 191. 
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of the low fines imposed on companies for breaches of company law.  
Indeed in his observation that there is little equivalence between the 
two penalties provided for under the Acts (a fine of IR£1,500 and up 
to 12 months in jail), he chimes with the Commission’s earlier 
remarks at paragraph 2.01 in relation to minor offences in general.  As 
he notes with regard to the offence of fraudulent trading:227  
 
“[T]he ratio of fiscal penalty to custodial sentence seems 
incongruous.  It is difficult to see how £1,000 could be the 
equivalent of up to 12 months in jail.  If we take the average 
industrial wage is in the order of IR£18,000, it perhaps might 
have been better to permit the courts the opportunity to impose 
a fine at that sort of level.  Given the reluctance in the 
judiciary to send business people to jail, the fine option offers 
the court little more than a chance of giving a director a slap 
on the wrist.”228  
 
6.04 This point has also been made recently in the context of the 
parliamentary debates on the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud 
Offences) Bill 2000.  As Mr C Lenihan TD noted in relation to the 
penalty of IR£1,500 (€1,905) provided for in the Bill: 
 
“Such a fine is a drop in the ocean when one considers the 
type of financial fraud which can be perpetrated against 
financial institutions or the State, such as false claims for 
European subsidies.  If we want to take on the corporate sector 
or senior executives of companies, we must ensure the 
sanctions sting them.”229    
 
 
(b)  Health and Safety Law 
 
6.05 Within the regulatory field, the Health and Safety Authority 
(“HSA”) has been particularly active in seeking to maximise the 
effectiveness of penalties imposed on offenders convicted of breaches 
of the Health and Safety Acts.  As is to be expected, corporations 
                                                 
227  Section 297 of the Companies Act 1963 as inserted by s.135 of the 
Companies Act 1990.  
228  Friel “Corporate Criminal Liability: A Comparative Analysis - Part I” (1999) 
CLP 191, 192. 
229  Vol 527 Dail Debates Col 279. 
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form the majority of the defendants in these proceedings, with the 
remainder being natural persons.230  Fines are imposed in nearly all 
summary cases.  Although most of the prosecutions brought by the 
authority are summary in nature it should be emphasised that the 
behaviour for which proceedings are brought will often have had 
extremely serious consequences for the victims involved, with 
accidents resulting in serious injury or even death.  Currently, the 
maximum fine for any offence under the Acts on summary conviction 
is €1,905 (IR£1,500).231 
6.06 The statistics from the HSA’s most recent report are 
instructive.  In 2001 the Authority brought 85 summary prosecutions 
and only 7 cases on indictment.  Of the summary proceedings, 
convictions were obtained in 73 cases and fines were imposed in 72 
cases.  The average fine imposed per case was €1,882 (IR£1,482) and 
the average fine imposed per charge was €885 (IR£697) (the same 
defendant may have faced several charges).  Notably, 36 of the 85 
cases completed in the District Courts related to workplace fatalities.  
Convictions were obtained in 31 of these cases with the average fine 
amounting to €2,306 (IR£1,816).232  A good illustration of the token 
nature of the fines imposed is provided by the details of a case taken 
by the HSA in 2001 against the Sean Quinn Group.  The Group was 
fined €1,270 (IR£1,000) on 6 February 2001 in respect of charges 
relating to a fatal accident in which a worker was buried alive while 
working in a six foot deep trench.  There can be little doubt that a 
€1,267 fine made little impact on a group which employs over 2,000 
people nationwide and has an annual turnover of IR£275 million.  
 
6.07 Indeed the inconsequential nature of the fines imposed on 
corporations for health and safety offences was the subject of recent 
comment from the bench in the highly publicised case of The People 
(DPP) v Zoe Developments.233  The defendant, Zoe Developments, 
                                                 
230  In 51 of the 85 summary proceedings initiated in 2001, the defendants were 
either public limited companies, private limited companies or public bodies 
such as the ESB.  See further Health and Safety Authority 2001 Annual 
Report (Dublin Stationery Office 2002) Appendix I, “Enforcement 
Statistics”.  
231  Section 49 of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 1989 as amended 
by s.41 of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997. 
232  Health and Safety Authority 2001 Annual Report (Dublin Stationery Office 
2002) Appendix I, “Enforcement Statistics”.  
233  Circuit Court 23 June 2000. 
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was prosecuted on indictment for breaches of the Health and Safety 
Acts resulting in a fatal accident and was fined IR£15,000 
(€19,046).234  In imposing the unusually high penalty on the 
defendant Judge Frank O’Donnell remarked that a fine “should be 
more than a blip on the balance sheet of the company”, suggesting 
strongly that in imposing a fine a court should have regard to the size 
and profits of an offender as well as the degree of culpability.235  
 
6.08 It must be conceded that a significant part of the problem is 
that prosecutions against companies are most commonly brought 
summarily in the District Courts and because of this attract only 
small fines when arguably they should have been brought before a 
jury in a higher court.236  However this does not detract from the 
argument that if there is a summary prosecution the fines imposed on 
companies should be capable of making an impact in order to act as a 
sufficient deterrent.  It is noteworthy that part of the motivation 
behind the recent review of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work 
Act 1989 was derived from the fact that some employers were simply 
not being deterred by the penalties applying to the Act.237  As a result 
of that review, the HSA’s Legislation and Guidance Sub-Committee 
recommended an increased level of fine not exceeding IR£2,500 
(€3,174) per offence on summary conviction.  This would apply to 
each of the three categories of offences under the new hierarchical 
                                                 
234  It was not the first time that the company had been before the courts for 
health and safety offences.  Indeed, in injunctive proceedings brought against 
it by the HSA in 1997 seeking implementation of a heath and safety plan, it 
was described by Kelly J in the High Court as a “recidivist criminal”.  See 
Irish Times 19 November 1997. 
235  See also the Law Reform Commission’s forthcoming Consultation Paper on 
Corporate Homicide. 
236  This problem was highlighted by Kelly J in the High Court in the earlier 
proceedings (see fn 180 above) against Zoe Developments, where he stated 
that he hoped that in the future the HSA would avail of going to the higher 
courts instead of the lower court, where “developers demonstrate contempt 
for the fines imposed.” Irish Times 19 November 1997. 
237  Mr Joe Hegarty, Vice-Chairperson of the Health & Safety Authority stated at 
the NISO Annual Conference, “Legislative Review - A Healthy Exercise” 
October 2001 Killarney: “Initially the Minister wrote to the Authority 
requesting that it carry out a review of the 1989 Act… He [the Minister] 
noted that while many employers had made strong efforts to improve safety 
and health, there were still those who had not responded and who were not 
deterred by the penalties applying to the Act.” 
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structure recommended by the review group.238  If implemented this 
would represent an increase of IR£1,000 (€1,270) on the previous 
maximum.239  The moderation of this proposal probably stems from 
the fact that there is perceived to be a constitutional limit of 
approximately €3,000 on the maximum fine which may be imposed 
for a summary offence.  That such a maximum is constitutionally 
required, at any rate in the case of companies, is something that is 
contested at paragraphs 6.27-6.31 below. 
 
 
(c)  Competition Law  
 
6.09 If a fine is to act as an effective deterrent, it is arguable that 
the amount exacted should be more than any profit which is to be 
gained from the illegality.  This argument is particularly apposite in 
the context of prosecutions brought by the Competition Authority for 
breaches of the Competition Acts.  The danger is that a relatively 
small fine of say IR£500 (€635) for an infringement of the Acts 
would come to be regarded as a minor cost of doing business.  Often 
the money to be made from evading regulations is greater than 
anything the company is likely to be fined if caught.  The Report of 
the Competition Authority 2000,240for example, provides details of the 
sole prosecution for price fixing taken against a company since the 
Competition Act 1996 came into force.  Judge O’Donnell in Limerick 
District Court imposed a fine of IR£500 (€634.87) on Estuary Fuel 
Ltd in respect of each of the two charges of breaching s.4(1) of the 
Competition Act 1996.  It is likely, indeed very probable, that the 
profits made by Estuary Fuel from the price fixing agreement it 
entered into with the filling station far exceeded the fine imposed.  In 
                                                 
238  For Category 1 offences (summary only), a fine not exceeding IR£2,500 
(€3,174) was recommended. For Category 2 offences, the same level of fine 
was recommended on summary conviction or on conviction on indictment, 
being a fine not exceeding IR£25,000 (€31,743).  For Category 3 offences, 
the HSA recommended the same level of fine IR£2,500 (€3,174) per offence 
on summary conviction or on conviction on indictment, a fine not exceeding 
IR£100,000 (€126,974) per offence or, at the discretion of the court, to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years per offence or to both such 
fine and such imprisonment.  
239  In the light of the HSA’s review, health and safety legislation is currently 
being drafted.  However, a Bill has yet to be published. 
240  Competition Authority Annual Report 2000 (Dublin Stationery Office 2001) 
at 15-16. 
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this regard, it is of interest to note that the Competition Act 2002 has 
increased the maximum fine for offences under the Competition Acts 
to €3,000 (IR£2,363).   
 
6.10 An interesting point of comparison with the domestic 
sanctions in place for corporations in breach of competition law is 
provided by the administrative fines imposed by the European 
Commission for violations of European competition law.  Article 15 
of Regulation 17 confers powers on the Commission to impose fines 
for infringements of Article 81(1) or Article 82.  These may range 
from €1,000 to €1,000,000 or a sum in excess of that but not 
exceeding 10% of the turnover of the undertakings involved.  This is 
despite the fact that Article 15(4) explicitly states that decisions taken 
by the Commission on fines “shall not be of a criminal nature”.  
While it has been strongly argued that these administrative fines fall 
under the concept of a “criminal charge”, as set out in Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, thereby attracting the 
Article’s procedural guarantees, this has not yet been definitively 
decided.241  It is of further interest to note that the Court of Justice has 
ruled that it is permissible for the Commission in fixing the amount of 
the fine to have regard to the total turnover of the undertaking as an 
indicator of the size and economic power of the undertaking.  While 
the Court stressed that this should not result in fines being fixed 
simply as a result of turnover, it does clearly indicate that fines should 
be adjusted according to the wealth of the offender. 
 
 
(d)  Environmental Law 
 
6.11 The above argument - that the fine should bear some 
relationship to the profit made by the company from breaching the 
law - also finds a resonance in the area of environmental law where 
there can be a substantial material gain from violating the law.  As 
noted in the recent Report on Criminal Enforcement of Environmental 
Law in the European Union242 (which unfortunately did not include 
                                                 
241  A case is currently pending before the European Court of Human Rights 
against all 15 Member States of the European Union on the grounds that 
these fines are criminal in nature and as a result were imposed in breach of 
Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.  See Senator 
Lines GmbH v Member States of the European Union Application No 
56672/00. 
242  Faure and Heine (based on work done by the IMPEL Network (European 
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Ireland), “environmental criminality typically is corporate crime”243 
and as such “it must not be forgotten that often serious financial 
investments have to be made to comply with environmental 
legislation… for instance, by… having to invest in a water cleaning 
installation or other abatement technology.”244  This has also been 
noted by the Environment Agency in Britain which has complained 
that the current scale of penalties for environmental crime is 
inadequate to promote good environmental performance.  Again, this 
is because it is cheaper for companies to commit environmental crime 
than to comply with the law.  At the launch of the Agency’s 2000 
Report, the Chairman, Sir John Harman, remarked that “fines will 
need to substantially increase for businesses to understand the 
environment’s true value.  The current scale of penalties levied by the 
courts makes pollution an acceptable risk.”245 
 
6.12 In many of the regulatory areas discussed above, such as 
health and safety law and environmental law, much of the legislation 
is of European derivation.  By far the bulk of community secondary 
legislation is received into Irish law by means of s.3 of the European 
Communities Act 1972 246 which allows for the creation of offences by 
ministerial regulation but bars the creation of indictable offences.247  
Accordingly, European Union (“EU”) directives, when they are 
transposed into Irish legislation, give rise to offences which are 
summary in nature and thus subject to the €3,000 upper threshold.  
 
6.13 This constraint obviously inhibits the deterrent effect of 
European legislation and also holds implications for its effective 
                                                                                                                  
Union Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental 
Law)) Report on the Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Law in the 
European Union (Danish Ministry of Environment and Energy 2000). 
243  This is also true in Ireland.  See, for example, the Report on IPC (Integrated 
Pollution Control) Licensing and Control 2000 (Environmental Protection 
Agency 2001) at 19.  Eleven out of the 15 defendants in proceedings taken 
by the EPA were limited companies. 
244  Ibid at 62. 
245  The ENDS Report 321 October 2001 at 13. 
246  See the comments of Collins and Fennelly “Irlande” in Rideau (ed) Les Etats 
Members de I’Union Europeenne: Adaptions, Mutations Resistances 
(Universite de Nice-Sophia Antiplois 1997) at 263-300. 
247  Section 3(3) of the European Communities Act 1972 states: “Regulations 
under this section shall not create an indictable offence.” 
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enforcement, as the maximum fine which may be imposed on an 
offender is obviously a factor which enforcers will take into 
consideration in deciding whether to prosecute under this 
legislation.248  As Scannell has noted in the environmental field:249  
 
“All offences created by regulations under this section 
implementing environmental directives are therefore triable 
summarily, are minor in nature and are punishable by lenient 
maximum penalties….  The deterrent potential of these 
penalties is thus minimised… this would appear to be contrary 
to the jurisprudence of the European Court in Harz v. 
Deutsche Tradax250 where it was held that sanctions provided 
under national law must have a ‘real deterrent effect - they 
must be such as to guarantee full and effective judicial 
protection.”  
 
6.14 Another relevant authority is the Greek Maize251 decision in 
which the European Court set out the objective of penalties under 
Community law.  Such penalties should be “effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive.”  Therefore, in the area of environmental law at least, 
the question could be asked as to whether a fine of €3,000 for a 
financially mighty corporate offender is adequate to reflect Ireland’s 
compliance with those objectives of the penalties.   
 
6.15 Indeed it is possible to go further than this.  Article 29.4.7 
(originally Article 29.4.1) provides: “No provision of this 
Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted 
by the State necessitated by the obligations of membership of the 
Communities…”.  It is certainly arguable that a higher fine is 
“necessitated by the obligations of membership” in order that the 
penalty for community offences may be effective and dissuasive.  
Moreover, this argument is strengthened by the recent decision of the 
Supreme Court in Meagher v Minister for Agriculture252 which 
                                                 
248  Of course if one accepts the argument made at paragraph 4.05 above, the 
maximum fine could be significantly increased for all offenders.  
249  Scannell Environmental and Planning Law in Ireland (Round Hall Press 
Dublin 1995) at 14. 
250  [1984] ECR 1921. 
251  Commission v Greece [1989] ECR I-2965, Case 68/88. See further Baker 
“Taking European Criminal  Law Seriously” [1998] Crim L R 361. 
252  [1994] 1 IR 329. 
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appears to suggest that it may be sufficient to satisfy Article 29.4.7 if 
Community membership renders the acts in question desirable on 
practical grounds, as opposed to mandatory.  While the suggestion 
must remain tentative for the time being, this authority certainly 
admits of the possibility that fines above the €3,000 maximum for 
offences derived from Community law would survive a constitutional 
challenge.  
 
 
B. Corporate Fines: A Comparative Excursus 
 
6.16 A brief survey of other common and civil law countries 
reveals that many countries have made special provision in their case-
law or legislation for heavier fines for corporate offenders.  The 
situations in some of these countries will now be examined. 
 
 
(a)  United Kingdom 
 
6.17 In Britain, as in Ireland, fines are the most common sanction 
against companies.  Magistrates’ courts are limited to a maximum 
fine of Stg£5,000 in most cases253 under the Criminal Justice Act 
1991, but the Crown Court has no overall limit.  While it has been 
observed that the amount of the fine actually imposed on companies 
is often not high enough to have a real deterrent effect,254 the Court of 
Appeal went some way towards addressing this problem in the case of 
R v Howe.255  The decision marked the strongest indication yet from 
the English courts that, when imposing a fine on an offender, it is 
relevant to take into account the fact that it is a corporate offender 
with concomitant resources. 
 
                                                                                                                  
 
253  Important exceptions to this Stg£5,000 upper limit are the penalties for 
health and safety offences for which the lower court maximum is now 
Stg£20,000. 
254  See, for example, the comments of Bergman in the context of fines imposed 
for breaches of health and safety legislation: “Any reform of sentencing 
procedures must question whether an upper limit should exist for corporate 
offenders”: Bergman “Corporate Sanctions and Corporate Probation” (1992) 
NLJ 1312, 1312, fn 3. 
255  [1999] 2 All ER 249. 
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6.18 The Howe case came about as a result of a fatal accident 
where an employee of the appellant, a small engineering company, 
was electrocuted.  The fines imposed on the appellant in the Crown 
Court for various breaches of the health and safety legislation 
amounted to Stg£48,000 in total (plus costs of Stg£7,500), a sum 
which the appellant contended was excessive.  Having outlined the 
appropriate aggravating and mitigating features to be taken into 
account in a case of that kind, the Court went on to discuss the weight 
to be attached to a company’s financial circumstances when 
determining the amount of a fine to be imposed.  While in general a 
fine should not be so large as to jeopardise the future of the company 
itself and that of its employees, nevertheless, “the object of 
prosecutions for health and safety offences in the workplace is to 
achieve a safe environment for those who work there and for other 
members of the public who may be affected.  A fine needs to be large 
enough to bring that message home where the defendant is a company 
not only to those who manage it but also to its shareholders.”256  
Vitally, moreover, the decision left the courts with considerable 
discretion in accepting that there may be cases where the offences are 
so serious that the defendant ought not to be in business.  On the facts 
in Howe however, the Court decided that the judge had given 
inadequate weight to the financial position of the appellant (as a small 
company with an annual turnover of only Stg£355,000) and it reduced 
the amount of the fine from Stg£48,000 to Stg£15,000.  
 
6.19 After the decision in Howe, there has been a rise in the level of 
fines imposed by the courts on corporate offenders,257 culminating in 
the record fine of Stg£1.5 million on Great Western Trains for health 
and safety offences.  Despite this there are still calls from some 
commentators in England for judges to seek information in open court 
about the company’s assets and recent profits before sentencing.258  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
256  [1999] 2 All ER 249, 255.  Emphasis added. 
257  See Hickman “Corporate Killing Reforms” (2001) 151 NLJ 912, 913. 
258  See, for example, Trotter “Corporate Manslaughter” (2000) NLJ 455 who 
points out that the Stg£1.5 million fine represented only 5.6% of GWT’s 
profit for the financial year ending 31 March 1998. 
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(b)  USA 
 
6.20 Prior to the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act in 1984, 
the maximum corporate fines which could be imposed for federal 
offences was relatively small.  For example, federal wire fraud 
attracted a maximum corporate fine of only US$1,000 per offence.  
The unavailability of large fines led to modest penalties being 
imposed on firms convicted of quite serious crimes.  The Sentencing 
Reform Act 1984 made two key changes in corporate sentencing 
standards for federal crimes.  First, it raised maximum fines for 
corporate offenders. Maximum fines for corporate felonies, 
misdemeanours and infractions were increased to figures broadly 
speaking twice as high as those for individuals.  Thus, for example, 
maximum fines for felonies and serious misdemeanours causing death 
are US$250,000 for individuals but US$500,000 for organisations.259  
Secondly, the Act created the United States Sentencing Commission 
and authorised the Commission to enact guidelines governing the 
sentencing of organisational offenders including corporations.  
 
6.21 In 1991 the Sentencing Commission, after considerable 
research,260 issued guidelines for fines that can be levied against 
corporations convicted of federal felonies or class ‘a’ misdemeanours.  
The procedure for determining the level of the fine is quite complex.  
While a detailed explanation of the formula applied is not possible in 
the limited space afforded here, it is interesting to note that the 
emphasis is largely placed on the culpability of the company since 
this determines the ultimate fine imposed.  First, a base fine is 
determined from factors measuring the seriousness of the 
organisation’s offence.  The base fine is then transformed into a 
recommended fine range based on the computation of a “culpability 
score” for the corporate defendant which ranges between 0-10.  
Surprisingly, the size or income of the defendant is relevant only in so 
                                                 
259  18 USC at 3571 (1988). 
260  Work began on the Commission’s Sentencing Guidelines for organisational 
offenders in 1986.  It is interesting to note that an approach to fining which 
was considered but ultimately rejected by the Commission, was a proposal to 
scale corporate fines based on percentages of a firm’s income or assets.  This 
approach was in line with the principle of equality of impact outlined above 
in attempting to standardise organisational penalties by imposing fines 
having similar impacts on large and small organisations.   
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far as it affects the scope of the conduct undertaken by the company 
or the ability of the company to pay restitution.261 
  
 
(c)  Australia and New Zealand 
 
6.22 The legislative provisions in place in Australia and New 
Zealand were touched upon briefly in the Consultation Paper. 262  The 
Antipodean jurisdictions have forged ahead with reforms in this area 
and in Australia legislation has been enacted which provides for 
higher fines for corporations at both federal and state level.  Examples 
of such legislation include: s.4(3) of the Commonwealth of Australia 
Crimes Act 1914;263 s.16 of the Northern Territory of Australia 
Sentencing Act 1995;264 s.40(5) of the Western Australia Sentencing 
Act 1995;265 s.431(2) of the Australian Capital Territory Crimes Act 
1900;266 and s.181(B) of the Queensland Penalties And Sentences Act 
1992.267  All of these Acts broadly provide for a multiplier of five to 
                                                 
261  See further Gruner “Towards an Organisational Jurisprudence: Transforming 
Corporate Criminal Law through Federal Sentencing Reform” (1994) 36 
Ariz L Rev 407. 
262  Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper on Penalties for Minor 
Offences (CP18-2002) at 61. 
263 Section 4B(3) states: “Where a body corporate is convicted of an offence 
against the law of the Commonwealth, the court may, if the contrary 
intention does not appear and the court thinks fit, impose a pecuniary penalty 
not exceeding an amount equal to 5 times the amount of the maximum 
pecuniary penalty that could be imposed by the court on a natural person 
convicted of the same offence.” 
264  Section 16(2) provides that the maximum fine a court may impose is, save 
where otherwise stated, A$2,000 in the case of an individual or A$10,000 in 
the case of a body corporate. 
265  Section 40(5) states: “Except where a statutory penalty is expressly provided 
for a body corporate, a body corporate that is convicted of an offence the 
statutory penalty for which is or includes a fine is liable to a fine of 5 times 
the maximum fine that could be imposed on  natural person convicted of the 
same offence.” 
266  Section 431(2) provides that a fine imposed in addition to or instead of 
imprisonment shall not exceed, where the offence is punishable by 
imprisonment for a period exceeding 12 months but not exceeding 2 years, 
A$5,000 where the offender is a natural person or A$25,000 in any other 
case. 
267  Section 181(B) of the Queensland Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 states: 
   “(1) This section applies to a provision prescribing a maximum 
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be applied to fines which are levied on corporations as distinct from 
natural persons.  In other states, statutes creating offences in areas 
where corporate crime is likely to be significant, such as pollution, 
provide for increased penalties for bodies corporate.  An example is 
s.27(1) of the New South Wales Marine Pollution Act 1987 which 
provides for a fine of 2,000 penalty units (A$220,000) for a natural 
person convicted under the Act, while for a body corporate a fine of 
10,000 penalty units (A$1,100,000) applies.  Other states provide for 
fines to be imposed on bodies corporate where the only penalty 
provided for individuals is a term of imprisonment.268  In New 
Zealand under various sections of the Land Transport Act 1998 a 
different maximum is also introduced for companies as distinct from 
individuals.269   
 
 
(d)  Canada 
 
6.23 Section 735(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code lays down the 
fines to be applied to corporate offenders.  The section provides thus:  
 
“(1) [A] corporation that is convicted of an offence is 
liable, in lieu of any imprisonment that is prescribed as 
punishment for that offence, to be fined in an amount, except 
where otherwise provided by law, 
 
(a) that is in the discretion of the court, where the 
offence is an indictable offence; or 
 
                                                                                                                  
fine for an offence only if the provision does not expressly prescribe a 
maximum fine for a body corporate different from the maximum fine for 
an individual. 
  (2) The maximum fine is taken only to be the maximum fine for an 
individual. 
  (3) If a body corporate is found guilty of the offence, the court may impose 
a maximum fine of an amount equal to 5 times the maximum fine for an 
individual.”  
268  See, for example, s.16 of the New South Wales Crimes (Sentencing 
Procedure) Act 1999. 
269  For example s.42(2), which sets out the penalties for a failure to secure the 
load of a vehicle, provides for a fine of A$2,000 for an individual and 
A$10,000 for a body corporate. 
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(b) not exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars, 
[€16,638] where the offence is a summary 
conviction offence.” 
 
6.24 It is generally accepted that the fine should be greater than the 
amount of any profit which has accrued to the defendant from the 
illegality.  The Code also provides special enforcement procedures for 
fines on corporations.270   
 
 
(e) France 
 
6.25 In many civil law countries corporations cannot be sanctioned 
under the criminal law - this is the concept of societas delinquere non 
potest.271  France, however, bowing to pressure from Europe272 and 
the French public (after a particularly high profile instance of 
corporate abuse)273 has embraced a comprehensive range of sanctions 
that can be levied against corporations.  The 1992 Nouveau Code 
Penal provides for fines and numerous other innovative penalties 
such as the dissolution of a corporation and its placement in judicial 
supervision.  Corporations can be fined up to five times the maximum 
for individual offenders and for repeated offences the maximum is ten 
times that for individuals.274  
 
6.26 In sum, it can be said that there are good reasons of policy for 
increasing the fines imposed on corporate offenders.  The sphere of 
                                                 
270  See Stessens “Corporate Criminal Liability: A Comparative Perspective” 
(1994) 43 ICLQ 493. 
271  This is the case under the Dutch Penal Code of 1886 and the German and 
Italian Constitutions. 
272  In the late 1980s the Council of Europe called upon Member States to 
impose corporate criminal liability.  This was followed by a recommendation 
from the Council of Ministers of the EC to impose criminal responsibility on 
corporations.  
273  This was the scandal surrounding the Centre National de Transfusions 
Sanguines (CTNS) whereby HIV infected blood was supplied to 
haemophiliac patients.  See judgment of 22 June 1994 Cass Crim 1994 Bull 
Crim No 93-83-900 (Fr.). 
274  Code Penal  1992 Articles 131-37 to 131-49 and 131-12 to 131-15.  See in 
particular Articles 131-38: “Le taux maximum de l’amende appicable aux 
personnes morales est egal au quintuple de celui prevu pour les personnes 
physiques par la loi qui reprime l’infraction.” 
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corporate offending is probably an area in which the hypothesis of the 
rational, calculating criminal has a realistic basis.  However, if fines 
imposed by courts are to have some deterrent effect, it is important 
they should signify something more than a mere “slap on the wrist” 
or, to quote Judge O’Donnell’s phrase, “a blip on the balance sheet” 
of a company.  As seen above, the problem is especially acute in the 
case of minor offences since, in practice, most prosecutions against 
companies for regulatory offences are brought in the District Courts.  
Moreover, comparisons with Britain, the US and other common law 
jurisdictions, and indeed with civil law jurisdictions such as France, 
serve to strengthen the argument in favour of increased penalties for 
corporate as opposed to individual offenders.   
 
 
C. Constitutional Implications of a Higher Maximum for 
Companies 
 
6.27 All this leads on to the view that there should be a higher 
maximum for companies.  However, there is a need to consider first 
whether there would be any constitutional difficulties in such a 
change.  The main difficulty, as discussed in the Consultation Paper, 
concerns whether it would remove offences from the category of 
“minor offences” in Article 38.2 so as to entitle a company facing 
such a fine to a jury trial under Article 38.5 of the Constitution.   
 
6.28 There is no case law directly on the point.  However two 
arguments are relevant here.  First, the decision of Barron J in State 
(Calcul International Ltd) v Appeal Commissioners275 concerning 
Article 37.1 is of interest.  Article 37.1 is an analogous provision to 
Article 38.2 in that it provides an exemption to Article 34.1, stating 
that justice may be administered only in a court of law.  According to 
Article 37.1 this is not required in “the case of limited functions and 
powers of a judicial nature in matters other than criminal matters...”  
The powers at issue in the case were those exercisable by the Appeal 
Commissioners under Part XXVI of the Income Tax Act 1967.  
Barron J held in the High Court that the powers before the court were 
“limited” and hence fell within the ambit of Article 37.1.  In reaching 
this conclusion he had regard not to the absolute amount of tax paid 
but to the relativity between the tax paid and the means of the 
taxpayer.  The correct test was the effect or impact of the power on 
                                                 
275  High Court Barron J 18 December 1986. 
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the individual’s income when exercised.  This Article 37.1 case, 
therefore, may provide guidance as to how the courts would interpret 
the “minor offence” exception under Article 38.2.  The judgment is at 
least suggestive of the possibility that the courts may adopt a practical 
approach to the constitutional issues from the point of view of helping 
to achieve fairness and equality of impact. 
 
6.29 The second argument is premised on the fact that a 
corporation, unlike a human being, cannot be imprisoned and that the 
maximum fine should be augmented to reflect this fact.  The existing 
constitutional case-law on minor offences, such as Conroy276 and 
Mallon,277 suggests that, if a punishment were imposed on a convicted 
person which consisted of both the maximum fine and the maximum 
period of imprisonment, such a penalty would be constitutional.  
Given that such a punishment could obviously only be imposed in the 
case of an individual, the Commission believes that there is no 
constitutional difficulty in increasing the maximum fine which may 
be imposed on a corporation to reflect the fact that the corporation 
cannot be imprisoned.  The Commission therefore recommends the 
introduction of a split level maximum fine with a higher level of fine 
to be imposed on corporations rather than human beings, in the belief 
that this would not violate Article 38.5.  It is important to note that the 
Commission’s recommendation will only serve to increase the 
maximum penalties for corporate offenders.  The District Court will 
naturally retain a discretion to take into account factors such as 
remorse, the undertaking of preventative measures by the offender, as 
well as the actual financial strengths or weakness of a company when 
assessing the appropriate fine in all the circumstances.    
 
6.30 A further issue concerns what the ratio between the maximum 
figures for an individual and a corporation should be.  The existing 
case law offers little in the way of guidance since it has never been 
necessary for the courts to consider which is the more significant 
element of a punishment that includes both imprisonment and a fine.  
However, the case law in other jurisdictions where the issue has 
received judicial attention, such as the Muniz v Hoffman278 decision in 
the US, is strongly supportive of the view that the imprisonment is the 
more serious element in the determination of whether or not an 
                                                 
276  Conroy v Attorney General [1965] IR 411. 
277  Mallon v Minister for Agriculture [1996] 1 IR 517. 
278  422 US 454. 
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offence is minor in nature.  This view also derives support from the 
value placed on the right to liberty in other contexts in Irish law.  
 
6.31 Despite these favourable indications, however, the 
Commission thinks that it may be constitutionally doubtful to 
recommend a multiplier of five for fines imposed on corporations as 
is done in Queensland or France.  The Commission is not cognisant of 
any constitutional difficulties with the multiplier of two applied to 
federal corporate offences in the US.  It therefore recommends that, in 
the case of a corporation, the maximum fine possible should be 
increased by a factor of three times that applicable to a human 
person.  
 
6.32 Thus, the following draft (modelled on the Queensland 
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992) is recommended:  
 
“(1)  This section applies to a provision prescribing a 
maximum fine (whether with or without imprisonment) for an 
offence only if the provision does not expressly prescribe a 
maximum fine for a body corporate different from the 
maximum fine for an individual. 
 
(2)  The maximum fine is taken to be the maximum fine 
only for an individual. 
 
(3)  If a body corporate is found guilty of the offence, the 
court may impose a maximum fine of an amount equal to three 
times the maximum fine for an individual.” 
 
6.33 This general provision would apply both to legislation enacted 
before or after the proposed reform.  This should not be retrospective 
since, in line with Article 15.5 of the Constitution, the increased 
penalty would not apply to offences committed before the reform was 
enacted. 
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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND  
   RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.01 The Commission is unanimous in its view that ideally, the 
restriction on a citizen’s liberty represented by a term of 
imprisonment of 6 to 12 months should only be visited on a person 
following a jury trial [paragraph 2.31].  They therefore exhort District 
Court judges to reconceptualise the sentencing maximum for minor 
offences [paragraph 2.32].  However, at the present time, the majority 
of the Commission feel unable to recommend legislation giving effect 
to this principle [paragraph 2.33].  The minority of the Commission 
recommends legislation along the following lines:  
 
“(1)  Without prejudice to s.5 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1951 as amended [consecutive terms of imprisonment], a 
District Court shall not have power to impose imprisonment 
for more than six months in respect of any one offence.” 
 
“(2)  Unless expressly excluded, subs.(1) shall apply even if 
the offence in question is one for which a person would 
otherwise be liable on summary conviction to imprisonment 
for more than six months.”279   
 
7.02 This provision would be subject to two exceptions.  First, 
those indictable offences triable summarily which are scheduled 
under s.2(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1951 as amended280 and in 
respect of which the accused has a right to insist upon a jury trial.  
Secondly, those indictable cases in which pleas of guilty have been 
                                                 
279  See s.27 of the English Criminal Law Act 1977. 
280  Section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1951 was amended slightly by  s.19 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 1967, ss.21(6) and 22 of the Criminal Law 
(Jurisdiction) Act 1976 and s.8 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1997. 
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entered and which have been referred with the consent of the DPP to 
the District Court for sentencing only.281  [Paragraph 2.35-2.36]. 
 
7.03 In relation to the requirement to give reasons the Commission 
adheres to its earlier recommendation that a District Court judge 
should be required to give concise written reasons for any decision to 
impose a prison sentence rather than a non-custodial sentence.  The 
Commission further suggests that, as part of this requirement, District 
Court judges should record the aggravating and mitigating factors 
which influenced the decision with particular emphasis on why non-
custodial options available to the judge were not appropriate 
[paragraph 3.17]. 
 
7.04 As regards fines, the Commission questions the correctness of 
the prevailing wisdom that a maximum fine of over €3,000 
(IR£2,363) would be unconstitutional, taking into account the 
maximum figures accepted for the 1920s and the changes in the value 
of money and wages during the intervening decades [paragraph 4.05]. 
 
7.05 In relation to fines, the Commission further recommends that 
effect be given in this jurisdiction to the principle of equality of 
impact so that the amount of a fine may be increased for more 
affluent offenders as well as decreased for those offenders of more 
limited means.  Legislation along the following lines is 
recommended: 
 
“(1) Before fixing the amount of any fine to be imposed on 
an offender,282 a court shall inquire into his financial 
circumstances. 
 
(2) The amount of any fine fixed by a District Court shall 
be such as, in the opinion of the court, reflects the seriousness 
of the offence.   
 
                                                 
281  Section 13 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967. 
282  The original English legislation reads, “on an offender who is an individual”, 
making a curious distinction between companies and individuals.  In the case 
of an individual offender, the English courts are placed under a duty to 
investigate the offender’s financial circumstances.  This does not apply in the 
case of an offender which is a corporation, yet the court is required by 
subsection (3) to take into account the financial circumstances of the 
offender in each case. 
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(3) In fixing the amount of any fine to be imposed on an 
offender (whether an individual or other person), a court shall 
take into account the circumstances of the case including, 
among other things, the financial circumstances of the 
offender so far as they are known, or appear, to the court.  
 
(4) Subsection (3) above applies whether taking into 
account the financial circumstances of the offender has the 
effect of increasing or reducing the amount of the fine.” 
[Paragraph 4.21]. 
 
7.06 In relation to the implementation of the above 
recommendation, the Commission considers that the mandatory use 
of a statutory form may unduly inhibit a District Court judge’s 
discretion  in assessing the means of an individual offender.  
Therefore the Commission recommends that the decision to use a 
means form when assessing an offender’s means should remain 
within the discretion of the individual District Court judge  [paragraph 
5.19].  A precedent means form along the lines of the form in 
Appendix 8 is recommended for individual offenders.  In respect of 
corporate offenders, the Commission does not recommend a means 
form given the availability of a company’s annual accounts as part of 
its annual return [paragraph 5.26].  In the absence of the relevant 
information as to means, the court should be able to proceed to make 
such determinations in relation to an offender’s financial 
circumstances as it thinks fit.    
 
7.07 Additionally, in relation to the fines which may be imposed 
for a minor offence, the Commission believes that there are solid 
grounds, most notably the fact that a corporation cannot be 
incarcerated, for saying that it would be constitutional to increase the 
maximum fine in the case of a corporation to a figure above that fixed 
for human beings.  There are also strong arguments of policy 
supporting the introduction of a split level maximum fine.  The 
Commission therefore recommends that in the case of a corporation 
the maximum fine possible should be increased by a factor of three 
times that applicable to a human person.  The following draft 
(modelled on the Queensland Penalties and Sentences Act 1992) is 
recommended:  
 
“(1)  This section applies to a provision prescribing a 
maximum fine (whether with or without imprisonment) for an 
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offence only if the provision does not expressly prescribe a 
maximum fine for a body corporate different from the 
maximum fine for an individual. 
 
(2)  The maximum fine is taken to be the maximum fine 
only for an individual. 
 
(3)  If a body corporate is found guilty of the offence, the 
court may impose a maximum fine of an amount equal to 
three times the maximum fine for an individual.” [Paragraph 
6.32]. 
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APPENDIX 3:  MAGISTRATES ASSOCIATION FORM  
FOR STATING THE REASONS FOR 
SENTENCE 
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APPENDIX 4: AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING 
FACTORS 
 
Aggravating factors 
 
 
(1) Whether the offence was planned or premeditated; 
 
(2) Whether the offender committed the offence as a member of a 
group organised for crime; 
 
(3) Whether the offence formed part of a campaign of offences; 
 
(4) Whether the offender exploited the position of a weak or 
defenceless victim or exploited the knowledge that the victim’s access 
to justice might have been impeded; 
 
(5) Whether the offender exploited a position of confidence or 
trust, including offences committed by law enforcement officers; 
 
(6) Whether the offender threatened to use or actually used 
violence, or used, threatened to use, or carried, a weapon; 
 
(7) Whether the offender caused, threatened to cause, or risked 
the death or serious injury of another person, or used or threatened to 
use excessive cruelty; 
 
(8) Whether the offender caused or risked substantial economic 
loss to the victim of the offence; 
 
(9) Whether the offence was committed for pleasure or 
excitement; 
 
(10) Whether the offender played a leading role in the commission 
of the offence or induced others to participate in the commission of 
the offence; 
 
(11) Whether the offence was committed on a law enforcement 
officer; 
 
(12) Any other circumstances which: 
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(a) increase the harm caused or risked by the offender, or 
(b) increase the culpability of the offender for the offence. 
 
 
Mitigating factors 
 
(1) Whether the offence was committed under circumstances of 
duress not amounting to a defence to criminal liability; 
 
(2) Whether the offender was provoked; 
 
(3) Whether the offence was committed on impulse, or the 
offender showed no sustained motivation to break the law; 
 
(4) Whether the offender, through age or ill-health or otherwise, 
was of reduced mental capacity when committing the offence; 
 
(5) Whether the offence was occasioned as a result of strong 
temptation; 
 
(6) Whether the offender was motivated by strong compassion or 
human sympathy; 
 
(7) Whether the offender played only a minor role in the 
commission of the offence; 
 
(8) Whether no serious injury resulted nor was intended; 
 
(9) Whether the offender made voluntary attempts to prevent the 
effects of the offence; 
 
(10) Whether there exist excusing circumstances which, although 
not amounting to a defence to criminal liability, tend to extenuate the 
offender’s culpability, such as ignorance of the law, mistake of fact, 
or necessity; 
 
(11) Any other circumstances which: 
 
(a) reduce the harm caused or risked by the offender, or 
(b) reduce the culpability of the offender for the offence. 
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APPENDIX 5: MAGISTRATES’ ASSOCIATION  
   GUIDELINE FINES 
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APPENDIX 6:  CRIMINAL LEGAL AID FORM 
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APPENDIX 7: CIVIL LEGAL AID FORM 
 
 
 118
 119
 120
 121
 122
 123
 
APPENDIX 8:   PRECEDENT MEANS FORM 
 
[     ] DISTRICT COURT 
MEANS ENQUIRY FORM 
 
The District Court has a power to impose a financial penalty if you 
are convicted.  In order to enable the Court to fix this penalty at the 
appropriate amount, please complete the following form. 
 
Date of Hearing: 
Case Number: 
 
 
PERSONAL DETAILS 
 
1. Name:   
 
2. Date of Birth:  
 
3. Address: 
 
4.  Number of Dependant Children: 
 
5.  Other Dependants:   
 
 
INCOME 
 
6.  Please indicate as appropriate: employed / self-employed / 
 unemployed. 
 
(a)  If employed / self-employed, please state take-home / 
net weekly income (including overtime):  
 
(b)  If unemployed, please state weekly amount of Social 
Welfare / Health Acts benefit: 
 
7.  Other sources of income: please indicate weekly amount as 
 appropriate: 
 
(a)  Maintenance:  
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(b)  FAS Course: 
 
(c)  Commission: 
 
(d)  Pension: 
 
(e)  Benefit in Kind (eg car, accommodation): 
 
(f)  Other:(eg rental income) 
 
 
OUTGOINGS 
 
8.  Please state the weekly amount of outgoings under the 
 following headings: 
 
(a)  Rent / Mortgage: 
 
(b)  Child Care: 
 
(c)  Maintenance Payments: 
 
 
CAPITAL 
 
9. Please indicate the amount of any monies belonging to you in 
the following: 
 
(a) Bank/Building Society Account: 
 
(b) An Post Account: 
 
(c ) Credit Union: 
 
(d) Other institution: 
 
10. If you own land or property other than the family home, please 
provide the following information: 
 
(a) (i)  Market Value Land: 
 
(ii) Outstanding Charge / Mortgage on Land: 
 125
 
(b) (i) Market Value of Property: 
 
(ii) Outstanding Charge / Mortgage on Property: 
 
11. If you own stocks or shares, please indicate the following: 
 
(a) Type of Stock / Share of Security: 
 
(b) Value of Stock / Share: 
 
12. If you are owed debts, please indicate the following: 
 
(a) Owed by Whom: 
 
(b) Value of Debt: 
 
 
Signature: 
……………………………………………………………………… 
 
Date: 
…………………………………………………………………….. 
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APPENDIX 9: LIST OF LAW REFORM 
COMMISSION PUBLICATIONS 
 
 
First Programme for Examination of 
Certain Branches of the Law with a 
View to their Reform (December 
1976) (Prl. 5984)  
 
 
 
 
€0.13 
Working Paper No. 1-1977, The Law 
Relating to the Liability of Builders, 
Vendors and Lessors for the Quality 
and Fitness of Premises (June 1977) 
 
 
 
 
€1.40 
Working Paper No. 2-1977, The Law 
Relating to the Age of Majority, the 
Age for Marriage and Some 
Connected Subjects (November 1977) 
 
 
 
 
€1.27 
Working Paper No. 3-1977, Civil 
Liability for Animals (November 
1977) 
 
 
 
€3.17 
First (Annual) Report (1977) (Prl. 
6961) 
 
 
€0.51 
Working Paper No. 4-1978, The Law 
Relating to Breach of Promise of 
Marriage (November 1978) 
 
 
 
€1.27 
Working Paper No. 5-1978, The Law 
Relating to Criminal Conversation 
and the Enticement and Harbouring of 
a Spouse (December 1978) 
 
 
 
 
€1.27 
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Working Paper No. 6-1979, The Law 
Relating to Seduction and the 
Enticement and Harbouring of a Child 
(February 1979) 
 
 
 
 
€1.90 
Working Paper No. 7-1979, The Law 
Relating to Loss of Consortium and 
Loss of Services of a Child (March 
1979) 
 
 
 
 
€1.27 
Working Paper No. 8-1979, Judicial 
Review of Administrative Action:  the 
Problem of Remedies (December 
1979) 
 
 
 
 
€1.90 
Second (Annual) Report (1978/79) 
(Prl. 8855) 
 
 
€0.95 
 
Working Paper No. 9-1980, The Rule 
Against Hearsay (April 1980) 
 
  
€2.54 
Third (Annual) Report (1980) (Prl. 
9733) 
 
 
€0.95 
First Report on Family Law - 
Criminal Conversation, Enticement 
and Harbouring of a Spouse or Child, 
Loss of Consortium, Personal Injury 
to a Child, Seduction of a Child, 
Matrimonial Property and Breach of 
Promise of Marriage (LRC 1-1981) 
(March 1981) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
€2.54 
Working Paper No. 10-1981, 
Domicile and Habitual Residence as 
Connecting Factors in the Conflict of 
Laws (September 1981) 
 
 
 
 
€2.22 
Fourth (Annual) Report (1981) (Pl. 
742) 
 
€0.95 
 
Report on Civil Liability for Animals  
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(LRC 2-1982) (May 1982) 
 
€1.27 
Report on Defective Premises (LRC 
3-1982) (May 1982) 
 
  
€1.27 
Report on Illegitimacy (LRC 4-1982) 
(September 1982) 
 
 
€4.44 
Fifth (Annual) Report (1982) (Pl. 
1795) 
 
 
€0.95 
 
Report on the Age of Majority, the 
Age for Marriage and Some 
Connected Subjects (LRC 5-1983) 
(April 1983) 
 
 
 
€1.90 
Report on Restitution of Conjugal 
Rights, Jactitation of Marriage and 
Related Matters (LRC 6-1983) 
(November 1983) 
 
 
 
 
€1.27 
Report on Domicile and Habitual 
Residence as Connecting Factors in 
the Conflict of Laws (LRC 7-1983) 
(December 1983) 
 
 
 
 
€1.90 
 
Report on Divorce a Mensa et Thoro 
and Related Matters (LRC 8-1983) 
(December 1983)  
 
 
 
€3.81 
Sixth (Annual) Report (1983) (Pl. 
2622) 
 
€1.27 
 
Report on Nullity of Marriage (LRC 
9-1984) (October 1984) 
 
 
€4.44 
Working Paper No. 11-1984, 
Recognition of Foreign Divorces and 
Legal Separations (October 1984) 
 
 
 
€2.54 
Seventh (Annual) Report (1984) (Pl. 
3313) 
 
 
€1.27 
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Report on Recognition of Foreign 
Divorces and Legal Separations (LRC 
10-1985) (April 1985) 
 
 
 
€1.27 
Report on Vagrancy and Related 
Offences (LRC 11-1985) (June 1985) 
 
 
€3.81 
Report on the Hague Convention on 
the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction and Some Related 
Matters (LRC 12-1985) (June 1985) 
 
 
 
 
€2.54 
 
Report on Competence and 
Compellability of Spouses as 
Witnesses (LRC 13-1985) (July 1985) 
 
 
 
€3.17 
Report on Offences Under the Dublin 
Police Acts and Related Offences 
(LRC 14-1985) (July 1985) 
 
 
 
€3.17 
Report on Minors’ Contracts (LRC 
15-1985) (August 1985) 
 
 
€4.44 
Report on the Hague Convention on 
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in 
Civil or Commercial Matters (LRC 
16-1985) (August 1985) 
 
 
 
 
€2.54 
Report on the Liability in Tort of 
Minors and the Liability of Parents for 
Damage Caused by Minors (LRC 17-
1985) (September 1985) 
 
 
 
 
€3.81 
Report on the Liability in Tort of 
Mentally Disabled Persons (LRC 18-
1985) (September 1985) 
 
 
 
€2.54 
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Report on Private International Law 
Aspects of Capacity to Marry and 
Choice of Law in Proceedings for 
Nullity of Marriage (LRC 19-1985) 
(October 1985) 
 
 
 
 
 
€4.44 
Report on Jurisdiction in Proceedings 
for Nullity of Marriage, Recognition 
of Foreign Nullity Decrees, and the 
Hague Convention on the Celebration 
and Recognition of the Validity of 
Marriages (LRC 20-1985) (October 
1985) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
€2.54 
Eighth (Annual) Report (1985) (Pl. 
4281) 
 
 
€1.27 
Report on the Statute of Limitations: 
Claims in Respect of Latent Personal 
Injuries (LRC 21-1987) (September 
1987) 
 
 
 
€5.71 
 
Consultation Paper on Rape 
(December 1987) 
 
€7.62 
 
Report on the Service of Documents 
Abroad re Civil Proceedings -the 
Hague Convention (LRC 22-1987) 
(December 1987) 
 
 
 
  
€2.54 
Report on Receiving Stolen Property 
(LRC 23-1987) (December 1987) 
 
 
€8.89 
Ninth (Annual) Report (1986-1987) 
(Pl. 5625) 
 
 
€1.90 
 
Report on Rape and Allied Offences 
(LRC 24-1988) (May 1988) 
 
 
€3.81 
 
 132
Report on the Rule Against Hearsay 
in Civil Cases (LRC 25-1988) 
(September 1988) 
 
 
 
€3.81 
Report on Malicious Damage (LRC 
26-1988) (September 1988) 
 
 
€5.08 
 
Report on Debt Collection: (1) The 
Law Relating to Sheriffs (LRC 27-
1988) (October 1988) 
 
 
 
€6.35 
Tenth (Annual) Report (1988) (Pl. 6542) 
 
€1.90 
Report on Debt Collection: (2) 
Retention of Title (LRC 28-1988) 
(April 1989) 
 
 
 
€5.08 
 
Report on the Recognition of Foreign 
Adoption Decrees (LRC 29-1989) 
(June 1989) 
 
 
 
€6.35 
Report on Land Law and 
Conveyancing Law:  (1) General 
Proposals (LRC 30-1989) (June 1989) 
 
 
 
€6.35 
Consultation Paper on Child Sexual 
Abuse (August 1989) 
 
€12.70 
 
Report on Land Law and 
Conveyancing Law: (2) Enduring 
Powers of Attorney (LRC 31-1989) 
(October 1989) 
 
 
 
 
€5.08 
Eleventh (Annual) Report (1989) (Pl. 
7448) 
 
 
€1.90 
Report on Child Sexual Abuse (LRC 
32-1990) (September 1990) 
 
 
€8.89 
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Report on Sexual Offences against 
the Mentally Handicapped (LRC 33-
1990) (September 1990) 
 
 
 
€5.08 
Report on Oaths and Affirmations 
(LRC 34-1990) (December 1990) 
 
 
€6.35 
 
Report on Confiscation of the 
Proceeds of Crime (LRC 35-1991) 
(January 1991) 
 
 
€7.62 
 
Consultation Paper on the Civil Law 
of Defamation (March 1991) 
 
 
€25.39 
 
Report on the Hague Convention on 
Succession to the Estates of Deceased 
Persons (LRC 36-1991) (May 1991) 
 
 
€8.89 
 
Twelfth (Annual) Report (1990) (Pl. 
8292) 
 
€1.90 
 
Consultation Paper on Contempt of 
Court (July 1991) 
 
 
€25.39 
Consultation Paper on the Crime of 
Libel (August 1991) 
 
 
€13.97 
 
Report on the Indexation of Fines 
(LRC 37-1991) (October 1991) 
 
 
€8.25 
 
Report on the Civil Law of 
Defamation (LRC 38-1991) 
(December 1991) 
 
 
 
€8.89 
 
Report on Land Law and 
Conveyancing Law: (3) The Passing 
of Risk from Vendor to Purchaser 
(LRC 39-1991) (December 1991); (4) 
Service of Completion Notices (LRC 
40-1991) (December 1991) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
€7.62 
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Thirteenth (Annual) Report (1991) 
(PI. 9214) 
 
€2.54 
 
Report on the Crime of Libel (LRC 
41-1991) (December 1991) 
 
€5.08 
 
Report on United Nations (Vienna) 
Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods 1980 
(LRC 42-1992) (May 1992) 
 
 
 
 
€10.16 
Report on the Law Relating to 
Dishonesty (LRC 43-1992) 
(September 1992) 
 
 
 
€25.39 
 
Land Law and Conveyancing Law: 
(5)  Further General Proposals (LRC 
44-1992) (October 1992)  
 
 
 
€7.62 
 
Consultation Paper on Sentencing 
(March 1993) 
 
€25.39 
 
Consultation Paper on Occupiers’ 
Liability (June 1993)  
 
 
€12.70 
Fourteenth (Annual) Report (1992) 
(PN. 0051) 
 
 
€2.54 
 
Report on Non-Fatal Offences 
Against The Person (LRC 45-1994) 
(February 1994) 
 
 
 
€25.39 
 
Consultation Paper on Family Courts 
(March 1994) 
 
€12.70 
Report on Occupiers’ Liability (LRC 
46-1994) (April 1994) 
 
 
€7.62 
 
Report on Contempt of Court (LRC 
47-1994) (September 1994) 
 
 
€12.70 
 
Fifteenth (Annual) Report (1993) 
(PN. 1122) 
 
€2.54 
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Report on the Hague Convention 
Abolishing the Requirement of 
Legalisation for Foreign Public 
Documents (LRC 48-1995) (February 
1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
€12.70 
 
Consultation Paper on Intoxication as 
a Defence to a Criminal Offence 
(February 1995) 
 
 
 
€12.70 
 
Report on Interests of Vendor and 
Purchaser in Land during the period 
between Contract and Completion 
(LRC 49-1995) (April 1995) 
 
 
 
 
€10.16 
 
An Examination of the Law of Bail 
(LRC 50-1995) (August 1995) 
 
€12.70 
 
Sixteenth (Annual) Report (1994) 
(PN. 1919) 
 
 
€2.54 
 
Report on Intoxication (LRC 51-
1995) (November 1995) 
 
 
€2.54 
Report on Family Courts (LRC 52-
1996) (March 1996) 
 
€12.70 
 
Seventeenth (Annual) Report (1995) 
(PN. 2960) 
 
€3.17 
 
Report on Sentencing (LRC 53-1996) 
(August 1996) 
 
€10.16 
 
Consultation Paper on Privacy: 
Surveillance and the Interception of 
Communications (September 1996) 
 
 
€25.39 
 
Report on Personal Injuries (LRC 54-
1996) (December 1996) 
 
 
€12.70 
Eighteenth (Annual) Report (1996)  
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(PN. 3760) 
 
€7.62 
Consultation Paper on the 
Implementation of The Hague 
Convention on Protection of Children 
and Co-operation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption, 1993 
(September 1997) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
€12.70 
Report on The Unidroit Convention 
on Stolen or Illegally Exported 
Cultural Objects (LRC 55-1997) 
(October 1997) 
 
 
 
 
€19.05 
Report on Land Law and 
Conveyancing Law (6): Further 
General Proposals including the 
execution of deeds (LRC 56-1998) 
(May 1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
€10.16 
 
Consultation Paper on Aggravated, 
Exemplary and Restitutionary 
Damages (May 1998) 
 
 
 
€19.05 
Nineteenth (Annual) Report (1997) 
(PN. 6218)  
 
 
€3.81 
Report on Privacy: Surveillance and 
the Interception of Communications 
(LRC 57-1998) (June 1998) 
 
 
 
€25.39 
 
Report on the Implementation of the 
Hague Convention on Protection of 
Children and Co-operation in Respect 
of Intercountry Adoption, 1993 (LRC 
58-1998) (June 1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
€12.70 
Consultation Paper on the Statutes of 
Limitation: Claims in Contract and 
Tort in Respect of Latent Damage 
(Other Than Personal Injury)  
(November 1998) 
 
 
 
 
€6.35 
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Twentieth (Annual) Report (1998) 
(PN. 7471) 
 
 
€3.81 
Consultation Paper on Statutory 
Drafting and Interpretation: Plain 
Language and the Law (LRC CP14-
1999) (July 1999)  
 
 
 
 
€7.62 
Consultation Paper on Section 2 of 
the Civil Liability (Amendment) Act, 
1964: The Deductibility of Collateral 
Benefits from Awards of Damages 
(LRC CP15-1999) (August 1999)  
 
 
 
 
 
€9.52 
Report on Gazumping (LRC 59-1999) 
(October 1999) 
 
 
€6.35 
 
Twenty First (Annual) Report (1999) 
(PN. 8643) 
 
 
€3.81 
Report on Aggravated, Exemplary 
and Restitutionary Damages (LRC 
60-2000) (August 2000) 
 
 
 
€7.62 
Second Programme for examination 
of certain branches of the law with a 
view to their reform: 2000-2007 (PN 
9459) (December 2000) 
 
 
 
 
€6.35 
Consultation Paper on the Law of 
Limitation of Actions arising from 
Non-Sexual Abuse Of Children (LRC 
CP16-2000) (September 2000) 
 
 
 
 
€7.62 
 
Report on Statutory Drafting and 
Interpretation: Plain Language and 
the Law (LRC 61-2000) (December 
2000)  
 
 
 
 
€7.62 
Report on the Rule against 
Perpetuities and Cognate Rules (LRC 
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62-2000) (December 2000) 
 
€10.16 
Report on the Variation of Trusts 
(LRC 63-2000) (December 2000)  
 
 
€7.62 
Report on The Statutes of 
Limitations: Claims in Contract and 
Tort in Respect of Latent Damage 
(Other than Personal Injury) (LRC 
64-2001) (March 2001)  
 
 
 
 
 
€7.62 
Consultation Paper on Homicide: The 
Mental Element in Murder (LRC 
CP17-2001) (March 2001) 
 
 
 
€6.35 
 
Seminar on Consultation Paper: 
Homicide: The Mental Element in 
Murder (LRC SP 1-2001) 
 
 
Twenty Second (Annual) Report 
(2000) (PN. 10629) 
 
 
€3.81 
Consultation Paper on Penalties for 
Minor Offences (LRC CP18-2002) 
(March 2002) 
 
 
 
€5.00 
Consultation Paper on Prosecution 
Appeals in Cases brought on 
Indictment (LRC CP19-2002) (May 
2002)  
 
 
 
€6.00 
 
Report on the Indexation of Fines: A 
Review of Developments (LRC 65-
2000) (July 2002) 
 
 
€5.00 
 
Twenty Third (Annual) Report (2001) 
(PN 11964) 
 
 
€5.00 
Report on the Acquisition of 
Easements and Profits à Prendre by 
Prescription (LRC 66-2002) 
(December 2002) 
 
 
 
€5.00 
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Report on Title by Adverse 
Possession of Land (LRC 67-2002) 
(December 2002) 
 
 
 
€5.00 
Report on Section 2 of the Civil 
Liability (Amendment) Act, 1964: 
The Deductability of Collateral 
Benefits from Awards of Damages 
(LRC 68-2002) (December 2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
€6.00 
Consultation Paper on Judicial 
Review Procedure (LRC CP20-2003) 
(January 2003) 
 
 
€6.00 
 
 
 
 
